Bank of Ghana officials and police officers were seen at the headquarters of Ghanaian fintech, Zeepay, on Tuesday, a day after the central bank revoked the fintech firm’s electronic money licence in a dramatic escalation of one of the country’s most high-profile fintech collapses.

The Bank of Ghana announced on Tuesday that it had revoked Zeepay’s Dedicated Electronic Money Issuer (DEMI) licence with immediate effect, citing “multiple regulatory breaches” and the company’s “persistent failure to comply with regulatory directives”.

According to the central bank, Zeepay had issued electronic money without maintaining the required corresponding cash backing, creating a negative variance that exposed customers and the broader payment system to significant financial risk.

The company also failed to comply with directives to inject sufficient funds to fully back customer balances and to wind down its electronic money issuance business. The regulator said Zeepay’s continued operation under the licence constituted a threat to the stability of the national payment system.

The revocation is the culmination of a series of mounting legal and financial troubles for a company that had positioned itself as a leader in cross-border payments across more than 20 African markets. In April 2026, the Commercial Division of the High Court ordered Zeepay and its founder and CEO, Andrew Takyi-Appiah, to jointly pay over USD 11.6 M to a customer for failing to execute fund transfers.

The court held Takyi-Appiah personally liable after evidence showed a substantial portion of the disputed funds had been deposited directly into his personal mobile money wallet rather than solely in corporate accounts. Zeepay has publicly pushed back against media coverage, noting the matter is now before the Court of Appeal.

Founded in 2014, Zeepay grew into one of West Africa’s most recognised remittance brands, processing more than 10 million transactions worth over USD 3 B in 2023 alone and raising substantial funding, including last year’s USD 18 M debt facility while expanding across multiple markets. But behind the growth, governance failures were accumulating.

In February 2026, the company’s chief financial officer submitted a resignation letter so blistering that he copied it to the Economic and Organised Crime Office and the Bank of Ghana, citing “material weaknesses and abuse” in treasury operations. Auditors Ernst & Young withdrew from the 2024 audit, citing “serious concerns over the quality and reliability of information”.

Separately, creditor Obsidian Achernar Ltd has filed a winding-up petition against Zeepay over an alleged unpaid debt of USD 1.22 M. In Barbados, the central bank suspended the licence of Zeepay’s subsidiary, Zeemoney, and the subsidiary subsequently applied for voluntary liquidation. The Bank of Ghana had previously fined Zeepay and suspended its forex licence in 2023 over a separate breach.

The Bank of Ghana has advised affected Zeepay wallet holders, including agents and merchants, to contact its support team. Under the Payment Systems and Services Act, a payment service provider whose licence is revoked is required to arrange to pay customers all their electronic money held within ten days.

The Digital Chamber, an industry body representing licensed payment service providers, said the revocation relates to a single institution and should not be interpreted as a reflection of the overall strength of Ghana’s digital finance sector.

When a gang of Boko Haram fighters on motorcycles attacked a military base in northeastern Nigeria a couple of years ago, they were stopped cold by a defensive trench surrounding the complex. They regrouped and tried again. Before launching another assault, they turned to a chatbot.

“We saw in a movie how motorcycles can jump over bridges,” a former Boko Haram commander told Antonia Juelich, a terrorism researcher at Cambridge University. “We used AI to learn how to do this. We gave it information, like what motorcycles we use and the distance we need to jump and so on, and it gave us steps on what we have to do”.

Mechanics modified the motorcycles for faster acceleration. The riders dug their own holes, filled them with broken glass and fire, and practised jumps until they cleared the trench. The attack succeeded.

That account is one of nearly 60 interviews Juelich conducted with 27 former members of Boko Haram and its rival faction, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in northeastern Nigeria between 2025 and 2026. The study, titled “God has helped us, and so will AI: How the Terrorist Group Boko Haram Uses Frontier AI,” was first reported by The New York Times.

The findings represent the first field-based evidence of AI adoption by an active terrorist organisation. Previous research had focused on propaganda, but Juelich’s work shows Boko Haram has institutionalised AI across its operations. The group has established dedicated AI units staffed with bomb-makers and engineers who analyse chatbot outputs on everything from bomb-making to battlefield tactics.

In some cases, the training was deliberate. Foreign trainers, likely members of the Islamic State network, conducted workshops in northeastern Nigeria where dozens of Boko Haram members learned how to use AI chatbots on laptops pre-installed with VPNs and encryption software. “The terrorists are not waiting for us to make AI safe,” Juelich said..

The study documented use of chatbots, including ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, Meta AI and Chinese company DeepSeek’s chatbot. Fighters asked for advice on repairing weapons, designing improvised explosive devices, improving operational security and even studying battlefield tactics to reduce casualties.

“We mostly used it in three ways: the first one is to learn how to assemble and use guns and how to manufacture bombs,” a former ISWAP commander said. “The second one is for surveillance, like how to improve our surveillance strategies to monitor what is happening in our camps and also to better understand our enemy. According to another former fighter, “There is nothing we haven’t received an answer on”.

Perhaps the most striking example of how quickly the group adapted came from bomb-making. “AI told us what chemicals to put in that made the explosion heavier,” a former commander said.

The study has limitations. The researcher acknowledged that claims could not be independently corroborated due to the secrecy surrounding Boko Haram. The report provides no forensic evidence, platform records or technical data linking the group directly to the AI systems identified.

Still, the findings have unsettled counterterrorism officials. “AI adoption by terrorist groups has been much faster, more extensive and more systematic than we thought,” Juelich told AFP. “But I’m worried about the trajectory, where terrorist groups embrace AI and the safeguards are not strong enough”.

The Boko Haram insurgency, now in its 17th year, has killed more than 35,000 people and displaced over two million. The addition of AI to its arsenal may not create new types of attacks, but it could make existing ones more efficient. “It has the potential to make them much more dangerous because it can make their tactics and their strategies more efficient and more effective,” said Graig Klein, a terrorism expert at Leiden University.

A particularly stressful episode involving some Nigerian car importers from a few years back was the encounter that radicalised Sheriff Adedokun, so to speak.

They had won the auction, beaten the competition, and secured the vehicle. The money was sitting in their naira accounts, and the supplier was waiting. The only thing standing between them and the deal was a payment that had to cross a border before a deadline.

“Watching businesses scramble to find alternative routes, rely on intermediaries or worry about whether a payment would arrive before the deadline made me realise how much unnecessary uncertainty had become part of international trade,” said Adedokun, founder and CEO of Clea, a Nigerian startup using stablecoins to help importers pay foreign suppliers. “It shouldn’t take that much effort for a legitimate business to pay a legitimate supplier.”

His frustration reflects a broader crisis. Cross-border payments into Sub-Saharan Africa cost an average of 8.78% for a USD 200.00 transfer in the first quarter of 2025, nearly three times the United Nations’ target of 3%.

In Nigeria, less than 50% of manufacturers could access foreign exchange from the official window in the third quarter of 2025, despite recent reforms. The manufacturing sector shed 18,935 jobs in the first half of 2025, up 74% from the second half of 2024. About 800 companies shut down last year.

Adedokun’s answer to this mess is Clea, a platform that lets Nigerian importers pay in naira and settle with international suppliers in US dollars within hours, using stablecoins as the settlement rail. Before Clea, Adedokun spent several years building businesses that served customers across different markets, so cross-border payments became part of the day-to-day experience.

“Over time, I realised that moving money internationally is never just about sending funds from one account to another. Every payment sits behind a commercial decision that someone is waiting on. It could be a supplier releasing goods, a business replenishing inventory or a customer expecting delivery,” he told WT.

Adedokun explained that working so closely to those transactions changed his thinking on cross-border payments. “I came to appreciate how much confidence businesses place in the financial system every time they agree to trade. When that confidence is shaken, the effects ripple through the entire business. That perspective has stayed with me and continues to shape how we think about building Clea.”

During its pilot phase, Clea processed over USD 4 M in cross-border transactions. The company is now expanding across all 36 Nigerian states, targeting importers trading with suppliers in the United States, China and the UAE.

***

Clea is one of dozens of African fintechs betting that stablecoins—cryptocurrencies pegged to assets like the US dollar—can bypass a financial system that was never designed for Africa’s trade volumes.

The bet is not without evidence. Between July 2023 and June 2024, Nigeria processed nearly USD 22 B in stablecoin transactions, making it the continent’s largest market. Sub-Saharan Africa received USD 205 B in on-chain value between mid-2024 and mid-2025, a 52% increase from the prior year. Stablecoins now account for 43% of all crypto transaction volume in the region, while deposits in Nigeria have surged 9,000% between 2018 and 2025.

“What convinced me was that we were not looking at stablecoins as speculation. We were looking at them as settlement infrastructure,” Adedokun said. “A lot of the conversation around crypto has been about trading, hype, and price movement. That is not what interested me. What interested me was the ability to move value faster, more transparently, and across borders without waiting days for traditional rails to settle.”

The shift is being noticed at the highest levels. Nigeria’s Central Bank mentioned stablecoins at least 68 times in its newly released Payments System Vision 2028. In October 2025, Central Bank of Nigeria Governor Olayemi Cardoso announced the creation of a working group to study how the country could adopt stablecoins. The bank has since reaffirmed its commitment to shaping global regulatory frameworks for digital assets.

This marks a remarkable turn for a regulator that, in February 2021, ordered banks to close accounts associated with crypto transactions and, not that long ago, detained two executives of Binance, the world’s largest crypto exchange.

But the path is not straightforward. Regulators remain cautious. South Africa’s central bank governor has warned that stablecoins could undermine monetary sovereignty by allowing users to effectively “manufacture” dollars outside traditional systems. In Central Africa, the regional bank has ruled out dollar-backed stablecoins entirely.

And then there are the banks. “The hardest ‘no’ usually comes from banking or infrastructure partners who see Africa, cross-border payments, and stablecoins in the same sentence and immediately assume the risk is too high,” Adedokun said. “Sometimes they do not even fully understand the use case at first. We are not trying to move anonymous funds. We are helping verified businesses pay verified suppliers, with documentation and audit trails.”

***

That tension between innovation and institutional caution defines the space Clea is trying to occupy. The African Development Bank estimates unmet demand for trade finance in Africa ranged from USD 74 B to USD 92 B in 2024. With African imports exceeding USD 1 T annually, the gap between what businesses need and what the financial system provides is vast.

Adedokun believes the answer lies in treating stablecoins not as a destination but as infrastructure, a step in the evolution of how money moves. “If you look at Africa over the last twenty years, we’ve consistently adopted technologies that make commerce easier,” he said. “Mobile money wasn’t successful because people wanted digital wallets. It succeeded because it solved a real problem. I think stablecoins should be viewed through the same lens.”

The real test, however, is whether this works for the businesses that matter most; the SMEs that cannot afford to wait days for a payment to clear.

“For an importer, sending money abroad is emotional. It is not just a button in an app. It may represent their entire working capital,” Adedokun said. “They need more than a good rate. They need to believe the money will get there, the supplier will recognise it, the documentation will be correct, and someone will support them if there is an issue.”

The tech entrepreneur contends that the importers who sparked his thinking were not looking for a revolution but simply a payment that would arrive on time. Whether stablecoins can deliver that reliably, and whether the regulators and banks will let them, remains the open question.

What is no longer in doubt is that African businesses are already voting with their wallets. Nearly USD 22 B worth of stablecoin transactions in a single year suggests the infrastructure gap is too big to ignore.

For years, the economics of African cloud infrastructure followed a simple pattern. Data generated on the continent was processed and stored elsewhere, mostly in Europe or the United States, while subscription fees and processing costs flowed out. One estimate suggests that Nigeria alone loses approximately USD 850 M annually to foreign cloud infrastructure.

That pattern is now being disrupted. Across the continent, governments are introducing data localisation frameworks, establishing national AI agencies and backing locally owned data centres. The goal, it appears, is not just to keep data within borders but to build the infrastructure that will underpin the next generation of digital economies.

More than 36 African countries now have data protection legislation in place or in advanced stages, according to industry tracking. Nigeria’s Data Protection Act, enacted in 2023 and implemented in March 2025, now requires major data processors to undergo annual compliance audits. The Central Bank of Nigeria has gone further, mandating that all payment transaction data generated in the country must be stored and managed locally from January 2027.

Kenya has published a cloud policy requiring government data to be stored within its territory. Rwanda, which already enforces strict data residency rules, has also approved the creation of a National Artificial Intelligence Agency, one of the first dedicated AI bodies on the continent.

“We cannot build an AI economy on foreign soil,” Joe Mucheru, Kenya’s former Cabinet Secretary for Information, Communications and the Digital Economy, told Panapress earlier this year. “The infrastructure must be here.”

That infrastructure is beginning to take shape. In March 2026, two Kenyan firms launched Servernah Cloud at the iXAfrica facility in Nairobi, presenting it as the country’s first sovereign-hosted AI cloud platform. The platform is designed to run AI workloads close to where African data is generated, shifting the region from an AI consumer to an AI producer.

***

In Nigeria, Kasi Cloud is positioning itself as the country’s first indigenous hyperscale data centre. The facility is aligned with Nigeria’s National Cloud Policy 2025 and aims to reduce the estimated USD 850 M annual outflow to foreign cloud providers.

Nigeria’s data centre market, valued at roughly USD 288 M in 2025, is projected to surpass USD 1 B by 2031. MTN has announced a more than USD 240 M investment into a new Lagos data facility designed to support AI and cloud demand.

Equinix committed USD 22 M to develop its LG3 data centre in Lagos, scheduled to open in early 2026. Rack Centre brought online a 12MW LGS2 data centre in Lagos, touting it as hyperscale and AI-ready. Open Access Data Centres approved a USD 240 M investment to expand its Lekki facility to 24MW by 2027. Across Africa, the data centre sector is expected to attract an additional USD 8.76 B in investment by 2031.

These are not isolated experiments. The African Union’s Continental AI Strategy, built on five pillars, puts data governance and sovereignty at the centre. The strategy acknowledges that Africa generates vast quantities of data from agricultural satellite imagery to patient health records, yet much of it is stored and processed outside the continent.

Still, the shift is not without complications. Africa holds less than 1% of global data centre capacity, and foreign servers handle an estimated 80% of the continent’s internet traffic. Building local capacity requires significant investment in energy, connectivity and specialised talent. Reliable electricity supply remains one of the biggest constraints on large-scale data centre expansion in Nigeria, where operators often rely heavily on backup generation and hybrid power systems.

“Data centres are becoming critical infrastructure for Africa’s economic future, but none of this growth happens without energy,” said NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber.

The political logic is that if African data must remain in Africa, foreign cloud providers will be compelled to establish local infrastructure. It remains to be seen, however, whether African governments can build quickly enough to capture value from the data their citizens generate, or whether foreign providers will arrive first, this time on African soil.

Nigeria’s stock market is on a historic run. The benchmark index has returned 67% in dollar terms this year to become the world’s best-performing equity market. Financial stocks have led the charge, with one insurer returning about 1,400%. Foreign portfolio investment on the exchange surged 274% year-on-year in April. The naira has gained 4% against the dollar.

Yet, in the midst of this record-breaking rally, Nigeria’s more prominent, eligible tech startups, some of which have been tipped to make the jump, remain conspicuously absent.

Three years after the Nigerian Exchange launched a dedicated Technology Board in 2022, designed to attract high-growth startups and deepen capital markets, the platform has yet to record a single initial public offering. Not one venture-backed technology company has crossed the line to list shares on the local bourse.

While Nigeria’s tech ecosystem has produced unicorns like Flutterwave and Moniepoint, raised billions of dollars in venture capital, and contributed nearly 20% to GDP, its most valuable companies are choosing to list elsewhere. OPay recently hired Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan for a potential US IPO. Flutterwave is reportedly weighing a London or New York listing. Tizeti, which had announced plans to list on the NGX, delayed its IPO.

A report by venture law practice TLP Advisory, which surveyed 36 founders, identified a combination of structural barriers. Currency mismatch is the most significant. Some 76.5% of funded startups raise capital in dollars but earn revenue in naira, creating a “fundamental economic tension” that makes a naira-denominated exit less attractive. Foreign investors who invest dollars demand returns in dollars.

Liquidity is another major concern. Compared to global markets such as NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange, Nigeria’s capital markets are considered shallow, with founders worrying about whether shareholders will be able to trade their shares easily. The NGX’s total market capitalisation of about USD 62 B is roughly 0.2% of the New York Stock Exchange’s USD 32 T.

Awareness is also a problem. The report found that 53% of founders lack sufficient understanding of the NGX listing process. Compliance costs, fears of undervaluation, and high listing thresholds—NGN 50 M for the Growth Board and NGN 420 M for the Technology Board—create further uncertainty.

Perhaps most critically, the standard Delaware–London–Lagos structure common among venture-backed African companies means the holding company and intellectual property typically sit outside Nigeria, giving investors a more stable legal jurisdiction and clearer exit options. Even when businesses generate most of their revenue locally, they remain technically foreign entities with limited incentives to pursue a local listing.

“There isn’t a lot of high-frequency trading activity,” Richmond Bassey, CEO of Bamboo; a Nigerian wealthtech startup, said recently. “Our market is still very young, and there are many challenges to solve. There are not so many options; there are no derivatives. There are many opportunities to grow the market.”

The irony is that Nigeria’s stock market has never been more attractive. Foreign investors are piling in. The country is on S&P Dow Jones’ 2027 watchlist for a possible upgrade from “Standalone” to “Frontier” market status. Dangote Refinery’s upcoming listing could deepen the market further. Yet the companies building Nigeria’s digital future remain on the sidelines.

The administrators of Koko Networks have begun marketing the company’s core ethanol cooking technology and an Indian manufacturing plant, in the first major step toward winding down one of Africa’s highest-profile climate technology failures.

The sale follows the company’s collapse in January after the Kenyan government rejected a Letter of Authorisation needed to sell carbon credits internationally. Without that approval, Koko lost access to the revenue stream that subsidised ethanol fuel prices for more than one million Kenyan households.

PwC, which is overseeing the administration, is seeking buyers capable of transactions exceeding USD 15 M, inviting expressions of interest by July 17 for Koko’s integrated ethanol cooking technology and manufacturing platform.

The assets include the company’s intellectual property portfolio—patents, hardware designs and software technologies developed over more than a decade—as well as its stove and canister manufacturing plant in Sanand, Gujarat, India. The fuel distribution and retail platform that supported more than 3,000 automated fuel stations across Kenya is also up for sale.

Founded in 2013 by Gregg Murray, Koko was backed by Microsoft’s Climate Innovation Fund, Mirova, Verod-Kepple and Rand Merchant Bank. The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency also backed the business with a USD 179.6 M guarantee. The company had invested more than USD 300 M in building its network.

But investors are now staring at massive losses. Creditors of the collapsed startup face losses of up to KES 22 B (USD 170 M) after the company’s assets were deemed insufficient to meet its obligations.

New filings by the Kenya-based company’s UK parent show total debts of GBP 127.2 M (USD 170 M) against assets of just GBP 1.45 M (USD 1.9 M) available to preferential creditors. The bulk of the claims comes from Koko’s affiliate entities, including Koko Networks Carbon Finance UK (GBP 44.2 M; USD 59 M) and Koko Networks Kenya (GBP 43.7 M; USD 58.4 M).

Koko’s collapse exposed the vulnerability of climate startups whose business models are built on carbon credit revenue rather than direct consumer margins. The company was betting on access to compliance carbon markets, where airlines use credits to offset their carbon footprint.

But the Kenyan government declined to issue the Letter of Authorisation required to sell those credits, with officials saying Koko’s scale of issuance risked absorbing most of Kenya’s available international carbon quota.

The irony is that Koko had spent over a decade building one of Africa’s most extensive clean-cooking distribution networks. It served about 1.5 million low-income households, significantly reducing indoor air pollution for urban and peri-urban families. It employed more than 700 people.

Now, that network is being broken up. Koko’s collapse has left more than one million households without supply and raised doubts about whether carbon-subsidised utility models can scale without direct fiscal support or higher end-user pricing. The shutdown has also exposed Kenyan taxpayers to potential liability to the tune of billions of shillings through a political risk guarantee issued by the World Bank, which insures against government breach of contract.

Feature Image Credits: Reuters

Kenya wants ride-hailing drivers to earn more per trip. The government is proposing a minimum fare that could more than double what passengers currently pay. The platforms say that will kill demand.

The Ministry of Roads and Transport has published draft regulations that would require Uber, Bolt and other ride-hailing companies to guarantee drivers a minimum payment for every trip before commissions, taxes and other deductions are applied.

While the government has not disclosed the proposed figures, industry sources say consultations have pointed to a minimum of between KES 400.00 and KES 500.00 (USD 3.10 to USD 3.90) per trip, up from the current base fare of about KES 220.00 (USD 1.70).

The regulations would apply regardless of distance, duration, dynamic pricing or promotional discounts. Platforms would be barred from offering discounted pricing that pushes driver pay below the mandated floor. The proposed minimum rates would be tiered by engine capacity, with different payouts for motor vehicles between 501cc and 1,500cc and those above 1,500cc.

The 18 licensed ride-hailing platforms were given a July 6 deadline to submit their views as part of a public participation process. Several firms reportedly refused to participate, arguing that the government had withheld the proposed rates and that the new pricing model would reduce demand.

“The minimum compensation model being fronted by the State is flawed and will kill demand and harm the drivers,” a senior executive of one of the ride-hailing platforms told Business Daily.

“The present base charge on fare is about KES 220.00, and the State’s move would see this rise significantly. They have declined to make an official disclosure of the rate, though word is that it may be set at between KES 400.00 and KES 500.00. This would be disruptive because very few passengers would afford it, and the demand side of the equation will suffer heavily.”

The government has defended the move as a response to years of driver complaints about earnings that fail to cover insurance, maintenance and wear and tear. In May, President William Ruto directed the National Transport and Safety Authority to fast-track minimum fare regulations following concerns raised by drivers over declining earnings. “We need urgent regulations that have already been developed,” the President said.

***

Driver earnings have been squeezed by rising fuel costs, insurance premiums and maintenance expenses. An Ipsos report released in March 2026 found that Kenya’s digital ride-hailing and logistics ecosystem is valued at approximately KES 132 B (USD 1.02 B), supporting over 1.5 million participants nationwide. The average ride-hailing driver earns about KES 63 K (USD 488.00) per month before expenses. After deducting fuel, maintenance and platform commissions, net earnings are considerably lower.

But experts warn that sharply higher fares could backfire. Digital economy entrepreneur Moses Kemibaro noted that a move from KES 220.00 to KES 500.00 would represent an increase of about 127%.

“That is not a routine fare adjustment. It is a major intervention in one of Kenya’s most important digital marketplaces.” He argued that the debate should focus not on how much drivers earn per trip but on how many trips they can complete. “Ultimately, the passenger is the source of the revenue everyone else is trying to divide.”

The ministry has invited stakeholders and the public to submit comments on the draft regulations by July 30. It will then review the feedback before deciding whether to gazette and implement the new rules.

The move follows the Transport Network Companies, Owners, Drivers and Passengers Regulations, 2022, which capped platform commissions at 18%. The government says it intends to benchmark Kenya’s approach against regulatory frameworks in South Africa, the European Union, the United Kingdom and Singapore.

The question is whether higher fares will translate into higher driver earnings, or whether passengers will simply switch to matatus, boda bodas and tuk-tuks. Kenya has about 35,000 registered ride-hailing drivers completing roughly 175,000 trips daily. If demand falls, drivers could end up completing fewer trips despite earning more per ride. That is not a trade-off anyone asked for.

Nigeria’s President, Bola Tinubu, has directed Nigeria’s competition regulator to investigate Meta, Alphabet, X and generative AI platforms operating in the country over allegations that they are exploiting Nigerian news content without fair compensation.

The probe, announced late on Monday by the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC), follows a joint petition by the Nigerian Press Organisation (NPO), an umbrella body representing the country’s major media groups. The media organisations have accused global tech companies of engaging in anti-competitive practices that threaten their commercial viability.

At the heart of the investigation is whether tech companies should pay for the news content they use to train their AI models, a question being asked in newsrooms around the world.

The FCCPC said it will examine whether copyrighted news articles, broadcast materials and other original journalistic content have been “extracted, scraped, ingested or commercially used” without authorisation to develop and train generative AI systems. The commission will also investigate whether Nigerian publishers have been denied “meaningful opportunities to negotiate fair compensation” for the use of their content.

The investigation aims to examine how Big Tech companies are taking advantage of Nigerian-generated content, from news reports to other locally created digital content.

The inquiry covers allegations of abuse of market dominance and anti-competitive conduct. FCCPC Executive Vice Chairman Tunji Bello said the commission would conduct an independent, evidence-based investigation. “We recognise the strategic importance of the media to Nigeria’s democracy and the equally significant role of technology in driving innovation and economic growth,” Bello said.

For Nigeria’s media industry, which has watched advertising revenue migrate to digital platforms for years, the matter is existential. The NPO argued that the practices of big tech companies have “weakened the commercial viability of news publishers and undermined the rights of journalists and content creators”.

The probe aligns Nigeria with a growing global movement. Australia’s News Media Bargaining Code, introduced in 2021, forced Google and Meta to negotiate payment deals with news publishers, resulting in about USD 1 B in payments. Canada’s Online News Act, passed in 2023, pushed Google into a USD 73 M annual payment agreement. In South Africa, Google agreed to pay ZAR 688 M (about USD 40 M) annually for between three and five years following an investigation by the country’s competition commission.

This is not Nigeria’s first confrontation with big tech. In 2025, the FCCPC secured a settlement after a legal battle with Meta over data privacy violations.

The investigation signals that the era of freely scraping Nigerian content may be coming to an end for Meta, Google and the AI platforms now in Nigeria’s crosshairs.

Kenya’s app-based delivery platforms are facing a significant cost increase after the country’s communications regulator created a new licence category that will see companies like Uber, Bolt and Glovo pay substantially higher fees to operate.

Under the new framework, which takes effect on July 29, digital delivery platforms will pay a licence application fee of KES 5 K (USD 38.68) an initial licence fee of KES 100 K (USD 773.69), up from KES 30 K, and an annual operating fee of KES 100 K or 0.4% of their audited annual gross turnover, whichever is higher. They will also contribute a universal service levy of 0.5% of annual gross turnover.

The Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) says the reforms are intended to align regulation with the rapid growth of app-based courier services, which have become an integral part of Kenya’s e-commerce, food delivery and last-mile logistics ecosystem. The government argues that the current regulatory framework has not kept pace with technological changes in the courier industry, where digital platforms increasingly coordinate deliveries without falling under traditional postal licensing requirements.

The new framework introduces a Courier-Hailing Service Provider licence for digital platforms that connect customers with licensed courier operators. Until now, such platforms operated under the National Courier Operator licence, the same category used by traditional courier companies. The distinction is significant because it recognises that app-based delivery has become a distinct business rather than a modern version of a courier company.

Platforms such as Glovo have expanded merchant partnerships across Kenya, while Bolt Food has entered supermarket delivery through Quickmart. Uber has also applied for a National Courier Operator licence, signalling its intention to expand into parcel logistics.

However, there are concerns that the higher fees could increase operating costs for delivery platforms, potentially prompting companies to review their pricing models or commission structures. The 0.4% turnover fee means that for a platform generating substantial annual revenue in Kenya, the compliance cost could run into millions of shillings.

For now, the expectation is that large multinational firms will absorb the additional costs. But smaller and emerging operators may face greater compliance challenges as the market becomes more tightly regulated.

The licensing move follows other regulatory actions targeting Kenya’s platform economy. The Kenya Revenue Authority has already moved to tighten tax compliance by linking eTIMS, its electronic tax invoicing system, to receipts of Little Cab, a ride-hailing platform. Kenya’s digital ride-hailing and logistics ecosystem is valued at approximately KES 132 B (USD 1.02 B), actively supporting over 1.5 million participants nationwide.

The proposed licensing framework also reflects the government’s broader push to formalise Kenya’s digital economy. In recent months, authorities have introduced new regulations targeting ride-hailing operators, online taxi services and digital commerce platforms as part of efforts to strengthen consumer protection, improve tax compliance and create sustainable regulatory frameworks for technology-driven businesses.

The immediate impact is likely to be limited, but the new framework could increase regulatory scrutiny of digital delivery platforms and lay the groundwork for future rules on platform accountability, consumer protection, data reporting and service standards. If companies do pass on the costs to consumers, the question is whether Kenya’s app-based delivery market can sustain higher prices without losing users to less formal alternatives.