Triple Trouble: The Curious Case Of The Ouster And The Oddities At Lidya

By Henry Nzekwe  |  October 1, 2021

A couple of months ago, one founder’s curious statement raised eyebrows in the African startup/venture capital scene, and the words go something like this;

“I didn’t leave Lidya to pursue other projects. The existing investors took control of the company in an unjust manner. Therefore, I’m currently litigating them in the U.S.”

Those words make up Ercin Eksin’s unvarnished statement, included as an update to a TechCrunch article dated July 7, 2021, announcing Lidya’s USD 8.3 Mn pre-Series B raise while also casually mentioning that Eksin had “left Lidya to pursue other projects.” Eksin had rebutted.

When the above comment from Eksin (the Belgian national who had co-led the Nigeria-born SME financing startup known as Lidya as Co-Founder/Co-CEO since 2016) became public in July this year, it raised a lot of questions and virtually no concrete answers, naturally.

So, what really played out at Lidya? What sort of dispute culminated in Eksin leaving the startup under circumstances that appear to be far from amicable?

As it turns out, it’s quite the story; one littered with allegations of questionable practices and inappropriate behaviour. There are claims of “sketchy dealings”, as WeeTracker learned from sources, in the early-day foundational moves that essentially helped Lidya take off.

Besides that, the dispute-ridden circumstances surrounding the founding of Lidya is itself a point of discord that remains unresolved to this day.

It might help to think of the entire puzzle as a slightly complicated subject that can only be dissected with a three-pronged fork made up of the following; founder-investor discord, a previous startup squabble that was kept under wraps, and a curious partnership laden with questionable dealings that possibly gave Lidya its start.

First, a primer.

Per information gathered by WeeTracker, the bone of contention between Eksin and “existing investors’ ‘ is a cantankerous affair, no doubt. But there’s more to discover than Eksin’s recent troubles with Lidya’s investors.

Digging deeper, the recent issues appear to be another instalment of feisty founder-funder disagreements that Eksin and his Co-Founder, Akintunde “Tunde” Kehinde, have been collectively embroiled in before. Only, this time, Eksin is all on his own.

Once upon a time, Eksin and Kehinde were among the earliest executives at Africa’s biggest e-tailer, Jumia. In fact, the latter is generally described as the Co-Founder of Jumia Nigeria.

After leaving Jumia within months of each other, the duo linked up on a new startup. They co-founded a company known as Africa Courier Express (ACE) which delivers logistics solutions to both businesses and consumers; a business that may have been conceived during their spell at Jumia.

The Co-Founders would go on to start another company, Lidya: a digital lending business that serves SMEs in Nigeria and parts of Eastern Europe, which currently boasts 25,000 disbursed loans running into nearly USD 100 Mn. But the Co-Founder’s decision to jettison ACE and launch Lidya caused problems and left a trail of disgruntled investors.

Starting from the back end of 2016, Kehinde and Eksin got Lidya going in Nigeria with the former handling investor relations, commercial transactions, and external representation while the latter tended to operations, technology, product development, and finance. And the company would close a USD 1.3 Mn seed round by 2017. However, a few well-placed sources, privy to the situation remain convinced that the traction that gave the startup its seed round was the result of a questionable partnership.

L-R: Tunde Kehinde and Ercin Eksin, Co-Founders of Lidya and ACE
Source: Ventureburn

Come 2021, Eksin finds himself forced out of Lidya following a disagreement with investors while his long-time partner, Kehinde, now holds the reins as sole CEO with the blessing of investors, apparently.

“Tunde Kehinde is the CEO of Lidya. Tunde and the team are focused on growing Lidya’s operations in Nigeria, Poland and the Czech Republic. We continue to wish Ercin the best in his future endeavours,” says a Lidya spokesperson in a statement to WeeTracker.

In response to queries centred on the specific circumstances of Eksin’s ‘forced departure’ from Lidya, Lidya and its investors maintained that it is “a personnel matter that they cannot comment on publicly.”

On his part, Eksin told WeeTracker; “the case is currently in litigation therefore I can’t comment on the specifics at the moment.” 

As it turns out, Eksin is currently embroiled in a legal tussle with Lidya’s investors who he believes unjustly froze him out and subsequently removed him from the company.

Court documents obtained by WeeTracker tell a story of alleged misconduct, an internal investigation, and a unanimous decision.

Lifting the lid on Lidya

On Thursday, February 4, 2021, Eksin, through attorneys, Fox Rothschild LLP, filed an arbitration application in New York via the American Arbitration Association. For clarity, arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution that happens outside the courts, only in the face of very specific conditions consented to in a pre-existing agreement binding the disputing parties.

The respondents named include Lidya Holdings Inc., its investors (Bamboo Capital Partners, Accion Venture Lab, Flourish Ventures, Omidyar Network), as well as three “Outside Directors” who are essentially the investor representatives that, along with Kehinde and Eksin, make up Lidya’s Board. The Outside Directors named are: Ashley Lewis of Accion, Ameya Upadhyay of Flourish, Christian Ruehmer of Bamboo.

In Eksin’s arbitration application, it reads that although Lidya’s investors had dealt with him in bad faith since mid-2018, it was a “harassment” allegation that brought things to a flashpoint.

Eksin alleges that “unfounded” harassment allegations were laid against him in mid-2020 by a former Lidya employee who has close ties to one of the company’s investors. The nature of the alleged harassment is unclear but Eksin claims it had something to do with a disagreement over a demand for unearned incentives and he claims the allegations of harassment are baseless*. [ refer to the note in the footer]

In late 2020, investor representatives discussed terms with Eksin with regard to voluntary resignation. But those talks stalled due to Eksin’s demand for investors to buy out some or all his shares at a price he deemed satisfactory.

So, on January 12, 2021, the Lidya Board met telephonically to make a final decision with Eksin present. The Outside Directors – plus Kehinde – voted unanimously to terminate Eksin’s employment as Co-CEO effective the following day.

In Eksin’s application for arbitration, he claims he had been frozen out, removed as Co-CEO by investors who collaborated with a former colleague to take control of Lidya, pressured to vacate his position as a Director on the Board and deprived of participation in Board decisions, and frustrated out a USD 10 Mn funding opportunity that he had sourced.

Eksin also claims he had been willfully denied Directors and Officers Liability (D&O) insurance and employment agreement, subjected to a “one-sided” investigation, threatened and bullied by the investor group, and blocked out of his domain.com, AWS, and Google Workspace accounts by Lidya employees, including his former partner, Kehinde.

On the other hand, Lidya, its investors, and their representatives (i.e the respondents named in Eksin’s application) filed a Complaint as Plaintiffs against Eksin in the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware on February 8, in an effort to stop the arbitration request which the Plaintiffs describe as “meritless.” And their account of what transpired expectedly contrasts Eksin’s claims.

The plaintiffs contend that Eksin had been determined unfit and terminated as Co-CEO following thorough investigation and assessment in the face of “unreasonable demands, accusations, and threats by Eksin.”

It’s also stated that Eksin is well aware that he was employed at an at-will basis, which – according to the company’s bye-laws that Eksin approved and acknowledged – meant that he (Eksin) served at the pleasure of the Board and can be suspended by the Board with or without cause. Moreover, the Complaint mentions that Eksin was duly represented in the investigations and his termination followed due process.

The investors assert that Eksin had demanded extravagant buyout of his shares in exchange for departing the company on consensual terms but when he didn’t get his desire, he doubled down on his unfounded allegations aimed at coercing payment to which he is not entitled, and the arbitration request is similarly motivated.

Further, the Complaint denied Eksin’s claims that his status as a Director on the Board was threatened and it says that Eksin became belligerent and refused to fulfil fiduciary and contractual obligations which demand that he must return all the company’s property in his possession or control after his employment was terminated.

Several other points raised in the complaint oppose each of the claims Eksin made as either unfounded, false, or the product of a fertile imagination. As it stands, the dispute is an active legal matter ridden with motions, claims, counter-claims, and a plethora of reliefs sought.

In any case, it won’t be the first time Eksin and Kehinde have found themselves in the middle of some kind of conflict with investors.

Taking it all the way back

After their time at Jumia, Eksin and Kehinde joined up to launch ACE, their first company together.

ACE launched in Nigeria in 2013 and given that it was under the leadership of two individuals who, between them, boast glowing points like Harvard/Chicago education and a wealth of experience in both corporate and venture business, it seemed in good hands.

And it did appear so for a while as ACE would go on to raise a total of USD 3.3 in two rounds Mn by 2015, while doing the business of helping partners and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) ship things locally and globally.

But things didn’t stay ‘well-and-good’ for very long as Eksin and Kehinde hit a snag with ACE, disagreed with investors, and began to chase the idea that became Lidya.

Of course, ACE investors – which include Interswitch, Savannah Fund, the family offices of a number of local high net-worth individuals (HNIs), angel investors, and several friends of friends and associates of associates linked to Eksin and Tunde – kicked against it. But the Co-Founders continued with their new plans, mindless of possible agreement breaches and potential consequences.

Problems began to arise at ACE starting from 2016, not long after the Nigerian payments giant, Interswitch, shelled out USD 850 K (through its now-dormant USD 10 Mn ePayment fund for African startups), as part of a seed investment in ACE.

Soon after, it came to light Kehinde and Eksin were pursuing an opportunity in SME financing, though this was initially thought to be a vertical within ACE, according to an ACE investor.

However, as it became clear that the Co-Founders had, in fact, started a separate company, presumably with resources meant for ACE, the atmosphere changed.

One of the individuals who represent one of the investment firms backing ACE spoke to WeeTracker on condition of anonymity given that the case remains an open matter some six years later. According to this source, the Co-Founders were initially cloaky about the details of the new business, until a dispute with Interswitch brought everything into the light.

“We initially thought the SME financing play was an extension of ACE given that logistics and financing have a connection in SMEs. But we didn’t know this was not the case until Kehinde told us they were being pressured by Interswitch, which I assume had found out they were launching a new separate company. What he [Kehinde] told us when he reached out with a complaint was that Interswitch was trying to bully them and take over their company,” the investor representative said.

According to the source, before long, all of ACE investors learned what was amiss and everyone – except Kehinde and Eksin, it seems – understood the grievance of the investors.

“Eventually, they revealed that there were two companies, ACE and Lidya, and they were raising money for the two companies at the same time. It was really strange. At one point, Eksin made a preposterous comment that we [the investors] were treating them like slaves for questioning their actions. I think they felt entitled to the success and that made them rationalise every off-the-book thing they did once difficulties arose at ACE,” the source said.

Claims and counter-claims

A letter seen by WeeTracker (sent by Interswitch’s legal counsel to Kehinde and Eksin), dated January 23, 207, cites a material breach of the share subscription agreement by the Co-Founders while also instructing them (Kehinde and Eksin) to cease and desist operations under Lidya.

The document mentions that the Co-Founders have exhibited a flagrant disregard of the terms agreed to by failing to devote all of their time to ACE; inappropriate use of ACE’s resources (office space, equipment, personnel, and finance) for Lidya; and the diversion of business meant for ACE’s finance/business arm to Lidya [particularly a potentially lucrative business secured from First City Monument Bank (FCMB)].

In addition, the letter listed other breaches related to failure to hold annual general meetings and issue audited reports since December 2014 in contravention of Nigeria’s Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).

“Imagine my shock when HBS-educated Kehinde claimed he didn’t know that audited statements for ACE were mandatory. They kept acting like they didn’t understand why we were irritated,” the source mentioned.

“He [Kehinde] later told me that they started Lidya because they thought it would be easier to raise money for a fintech. In my view, they just knew they could get away with such a thing here. I think it all comes down to the fact that building a financing business required them to raise more funding; they knew raising more capital for ACE would dilute them further, so they decided to launch a whole new company,” the source claimed.

Eksin’s take on this matter is that ACE was a few months away from bankruptcy in the midst of an economic crisis in Nigeria and existing investors did not want to put in additional financing.

“We updated all the ACE investors proactively at the time in which they were fully aware that without further backing of the company, the company faces liquidation yet they chose not to invest further,” he told WeeTracker. Kehinde did not comment on this matter.

As the situation worsened, they got started with Lidya, and Eksin claims they did not use ACE’s resources for Lidya, and they informed ACE’s investors that they won’t be running ACE day-to-day, and even got some of ACE’s investors to back Lidya.

Eksin also claims audits were conducted on ACE’s accounts by EY and KPMG and no irregularities were discovered, though he wouldn’t share any supporting documentation, citing confidentiality clauses. Moreover, affected parties dispute this and maintain that the Co-Founders always sought to obfuscate.

A tumultuous time

A source from the ACE investor camp stated that they had refrained from putting more money into the startup due to the lack of consensus on a forward path and disagreements over the company’s spending on a foreign contractor at a time when currency exchange rates were very unstable in Nigeria.

The source also mentioned it had initially appeared that a financing arm under ACE was the way forward until it was discovered Eksin and Kehinde had chosen an option that is most convenient to them by launching Lidya as a separate company.

“After we heard about Lidya’s successful fundraiser, they initially said they were going to run the businesses together. We proposed maybe one being CEO of ACE, and the other being CEO of Lidya. That offer was rejected. They haven’t explained the choice to leave ACE investors out of Lidya. Jack Dorsey leads Square and then they created CashApp as a subsidiary of Square. Why couldn’t they have done a structure like that?,” said the source. 

“For example, they could have created Lidya as a wholly-owned subsidiary of ACE and then raised for Lidya. They are presenting this like there weren’t options. I know that Eksin and Tunde know that there are multiple legal structures they could have explored. They chose the one that was most convenient for them,” the source added.

In response, Eksin argues no harm, no foul.

“If they really believed that we did something against the agreements and/or did something illegal, they could have easily taken legal action. There were some investors that were upset, especially the ones that didn’t invest in Lidya at the time. But ‘upset’ doesn’t mean the launch of Lidya is illegal or unethical. Those investors demanded free shares in Lidya because they backed us in ACE and we refused, that’s why they were upset,” he says.

Addressing this, another ACE investor representative told WeeTracker that only one or two ACE investors committed fresh capital to Lidya with the overwhelming majority shortchanged by the Co-Founders.

This source also mentioned that ACE’s investors opted to keep the matter quiet in the hopes of a resolution that is yet to happen to this day. As was explained, the matter has been kept under wraps and the parties involved opted not to go to the courts for reasons mostly tied to optics.

“As a lot of the investors are Nigerian HNIs, they felt uneasy during this conflict with the Co-Founders because they felt it would look like a bunch of older, powerful Nigerians bullying a young startup. I thought it was silly and this is where I actually disagree with the group,” the source said.

“The legal point has also been addressed. Investors don’t really want to. That doesn’t mean that what they did wasn’t in breach of a contract. Frankly, it doesn’t even mean that investors don’t think they breached contract. It simply means that investors don’t want to sue,” the investor representative reiterated.

According to persons familiar with the matter, there’s been a few feeble attempts to set things right with ACE and disgruntled investors in the past year or so, but nothing concrete has emerged as of yet.

Besides all these happenings at ACE, questions have also been raised about the early dealings through which Eksin and Kehinde possibly got Lidya off the ground.

Something to ponder

Back in 2013, Kehinde, Eksin, and a certain Polish national named Marek Zmyslowski crossed paths while they were all employed at Africa Internet Group (AIG), which eventually became Jumia.

One by one, they all moved on from Jumia eventually. And by the time they reconnected in 2016, Eksin and Kehinde were in the process of jettisoning ACE for Lidya while Zmyslowski was making progress with HotelOga [also Hotel Technology Solutions (HTS)]; a hotel booking platform he had set up in Nigeria having previously been employed at Jovago (a fringe AIG unit which later became Jumia Travel and has since been offloaded by Jumia).

While Kehinde and Eksin were engaged in founder-funder troubles of their own given the ACE/Lidya squabble, Zmyslowski would himself become the centre of a messy affair later on.

Marek Zmyslowski
Source: NewswireNGR

This ‘messy affair’ is ridden with mountains of evidence backing claims from the investors who backed HotelOga that he (Zmysłowski) defrauded investors, brokered questionable deals, and siphoned off tens of thousands of dollars in company funds into his private account. Of course, Zmyslowski claims the opposite, alluding to a gang-up against him, though he has since departed Nigeria.

In any case, there is also evidence that Zmyslowski went behind their backs to make deals to sell the company and that he ran a Polish-registered entity, Hotel Online sp. z.o.o, where the hotel management software platform’s intellectual property (IP) was held, unbeknownst to HotelOga investors who were willfully kept in the dark through the designs of Zmyslowski and his Polish associates, including HotelOga Co-Founder, Maciej Prostak, and a group of Polish investors, plus an East African hospitality company.

(All these details will be treated in a separate story after WeeTracker gathers more information.)

Now, back to ties that bind Lidya and HotelOga.

According to Eksin, Lidya started by financing the invoices of the suppliers of the large businesses.

“We reached out to large companies as well as SMEs, that’s how we acquired the initial set of customers,” he says.

Starting from 2016, HotelOga became one of Lidya’s first clients and the arrangement was such that Lidya financed HotelOga’s operations by providing short-term loans against HotelOga invoices.

“Big OTAs like Expedia paid HotelOga in 60 days for clients bookings after the client hotel check-in, while HotelOga had to pay the hotel before the hotel check-in. HotelOga was still a startup without funding to secure this cashflow, which is why we used Lidya financing services,” Zmyslowski tells WeeTracker.

In the same vein, Eksin recalls they agreed that Lidya will finance the hotels directly at the point of guest check-in and HotelOga will pay back to Lidya after 30 days once they receive the payment back from Expedia.

“HotelOga and Expedia had an agreement at the time that HotelOga would process the payments for the hotels unless they explicitly choose to process on their own that’s why they were getting paid directly from Expedia,” Eksin tells WeeTracker.

“HotelOga decided to offer interest-free loans to the hotels to acquire them faster. As the project was a big success, after a few months, we signed an agreement with Expedia, HotelOga and Lidya to provide the loans directly to the hotels against the Expedia bookings and Lidya would start to process the payments directly with Expedia to scale the project,” he adds.

At that time in 2016, Lidya was just as much a fledgling startup as HotelOga, and it remains unclear how Lidya was capable enough – in terms of technological/financial structure – to assess risk and underwrite such loans to another startup that was just starting out.

But perhaps Lidya didn’t need to do all that as Lidya’s Co-Founders and Zmyslowski were noted by former employees to be chummy enough that Zmyslowski ditched HotelOga original offices despite the pricey lease and moved HotelOga’s operations to Lidya’s offices, even though it added another NGN 300 K to the monthly burn rate.

Also, WeeTracker gathered that Zmyslowski made the unilateral decision to handover the credit/receivables/payment processing business to Lidya despite established interest from investing partners who had put additional capital into a cash-strapped HotelOga based on the understanding that the investing partners would handle the payments side and other ancillary products and services that serve HotelOga’s customer base.

A deep source mentioned that Zmyslowski gave the business to Lidya and the terms of the deal are confounding.

“Without discussion and approval and in the absence of documentation, he borrowed NGN 22 Mn from Lidya. HotelOga was making only 2-4 percent on every booking, yet Lidya was charging HotelOga an average of 9.9 percent a month on the loans, which annualised is about 55 percent with some as high as 206 percent. It was a ridiculous rate for us but phenomenal for Lidya,” the source says.

“Also, I wonder how a technically-yet-to-fully-launch Lidya – which only kicked off in Nigeria after November 2016 – shelled out NGN 22 Mn. Who takes ~USD 70 K on a single name or credit risk that also happens to be a startup? Don’t even get me started on the regulatory hurdles to extend such a loan,” the source adds.

Be that as it may, WeeTracker learned from a source that Zmyslowski suddenly demanded that the sum of NGN 10 Mn be made to Lidya immediately without an invoice on January 24, 2017.

When HotelOga’s financial controller refused to oblige due to a feeling of suspicion and discomfort given the lack of transparency and documentation, as well as the sudden urgency of the request and Zmyslowski blatant refusal to attempt to restructure the payment with Lidya, Zmyslowski unceremoniously fired the finance official on February 3, 2017.

It was then communicated that Lidya, which had gotten itself in a position to collect payments for HotelOga, had no problems deducting what it was owed from the source: money collected by Lidya for HotelOga from big OTAs and other channels, which would result in HotelOga failing to pay the hotels on its platform.

According to the source, HotelOga was forced to make a payment of around NGN 6 Mn to Lidya to avoid disruption of its business but company officials remained suspicious of a “backdoor arrangement” between Zmyslowski and Lidya’s Co-Founders who were battling with ACE’s investors over Lidya at the time.

It was a point of concern that HotelOga funds might seed a disputed venture and expose HotelOga to litigation. Moreover, records had shown Lidya was paying Zmyslowski’s personal hotel expenses and passing the bill to HotelOga as of December 2016. It did seem like something wasn’t right.

As it turns out, authentic bank records seen by WeeTracker show that on February 16, 2017 – just two weeks after HotelOga’s finance personnel was forced to make that NGN 6 Mn payment to Lidya – Eksin, Lidya’s Co-Founder, personally wired USD 5,018.oo as “seed capital” into a Polish bank account belonging to Hotel Online, the previously mentioned Polish entity set up by Zmysłowski and Prostak, which actually owned the core technology and IP that HotelOga depends on.

Zmyslowski is said to have initially concealed the Polish entity from investors who backed the Nigerian entity, HotelOga, which by itself is little more than a shell company with contracts with Nigerian hotels and no technology.

By March 2017, Lidya announced a USD 1.3 Mn seed round, weeks after the loan issue with HotelOga and a strange ~USD 5 K payment made by Lidya’s Co-Founder to a foreign entity tied to Zmyslowski, who also happens to be HotelOga’s Co-Founder/CEO.

One source told WeeTracker that the relationship between Zmyslowski and Lidya’s Co-Founders was an “unholy union” that seeded Lidya.

“They got traction by playing dirty with Marek and claiming HotelOga’s customers as their own so that investors would be nudged to invest in Lidya. It’s always been fishy from the start, that’s why Lidya is now in Poland and Czech Republic even though it’s supposed to be a lending platform for African SMEs,” the source argued.

On their part, Eksin and Zmyslowski both maintain that the ~USD 5 K direct transfer which Eksin made to the Hotel Online account in 2017 was an angel investment, and that the early loans to HotelOga came with the best terms in the market with all the necessary approvals obtained – something that former HotelOga officials dispute.

As a side note, Zmyslowski initially claimed he had no recollection of the wire transfer from Eksin but eventually recalled and confirmed the transaction after a follow-up by WeeTracker.

When queried as to why he was never listed among Hotel Online shareholders in public company documents available online from the Polish public register (given that he invested in the company), Eksin says he never received his shares though he wouldn’t volunteer any documents to authenticate an angel investment deal or a trail that can be used to establish funding talks with Hotel Online.

“As I believed in the potential of HotelOga and Marek was raising financing for his company at the time, I decided to invest in his company and wired UD 5 K as an angel investment. I ended up never receiving my shares. Unfortunately, that was the only sour angel investment that I had in Nigeria,” he says.

As for how the then-beleaguered Lidya was able to bankroll HotelOga to such an extent in the beginning, the embattled Lidya Co-Founder maintains Lidya was launched with financing from himself, Kehinde, and ACE investors that opted to also back Lidya. However, question marks would probably continue to linger.

——————————————————————————————————————

NOTE: This is a developing story and is based on the accounts of persons involved in the matter. This article is an aggregated version of claims made by all the parties and WeeTracker takes no responsibility for wrong information provided by any of the parties.

*As per a document seen by WeeTracker, the harassment case against Ercin Eksin could not be established by a subcommittee’s informal findings.

A Nigerian Startup’s Newest Model Is Crushing OpenAI And Google

By Staff Reporter  |  March 6, 2026

“Sorry, I didn’t catch that.”

For millions of Africans, this robotic apology from Siri or Alexa isn’t just a minor annoyance.

When a common phrase like “No worry, e go better” gets transcribed as “No war eagle butter,” or the name “Chukwuebuka” becomes “Check wheelchair baker,” the promise of voice technology; the hands-free shortcut that makes life easier in the rest of the world, remains a frustrating mirage on the continent.

This week, Nigerian AI startup Intron released its latest salvo aimed at fixing that gap. With the launch of Sahara v2, the company claims it isn’t just catching up to Silicon Valley, but leapfrogging it, at least when it comes to understanding how Africa actually speaks.

But in a market suddenly crowded with identical solutions from Google to Toronto-based Cohere, the question is no longer just who has the best algorithm, but who will win the race to build the underlying infrastructure for Africa’s eventual billion voice users.

Intron’s new model is a significant technical feat. Trained on over 50,000 hours of audio from 40,000 speakers across 30 countries, Sahara v2 now supports 57 languages, including 24 new additions like Hausa, Swahili, Yoruba, and Zulu.

Intron claims Sahara v2 performs 68.6% better than leading models.

Unlike global models trained on pristine studio audio, Intron built its dataset in the wild, capturing the chaos of busy Nigerian clinics, Kenyan call centres, and South African courtrooms where background noise and overlapping speech are the norm.

The results, per the company’s benchmarks, are striking. Intron claims Sahara v2 performs 68.6% better than leading models like GPT-4 and Gemini on transcribing African names, organisations, and locations. In noisy environments, it boasts a 36.5% improvement in “hallucination robustness”—tech speak for making things up when it can’t hear clearly.

***

Yet, the most telling feature is the debut of the world’s first bilingual Swahili-English ASR model, developed with Kenyan healthcare provider Penda Health. This model handles “code-switching”—the instinctive habit of bouncing between languages mid-sentence that defines everyday conversation across Africa’s urban centres. Global AI typically chokes on this; Intron is banking on it being its competitive moat.

“We built for the hardest environment first,” Tobi Olatunji, Intron’s CEO and a former physician, said during the launch, referencing the startup’s origin story in overstretched Nigerian hospitals.

But Intron’s timing is precarious. The window for being the only player focused on African linguistics is closing fast. Just weeks before Intron’s announcement, Toronto-based Cohere launched “Tiny Aya,” a suite of multilingual models supporting over 70 languages, specifically designed to run on local devices in regions with spotty infrastructure.

Similarly, Microsoft Research introduced Paza, an initiative that includes a benchmark for low-resource African languages, while Google dropped WAXAL, an open speech dataset covering 21 Sub-Saharan languages.

This flurry of activity validates Intron’s thesis, but it also threatens to commoditise it. If Google and Microsoft are releasing open data and benchmarks, the barrier to entry for other startups lowers, and the pricing power for incumbents erodes.

Intron is trying to stay ahead by going deeper into the “plumbing.” Sahara v2 is being deployed to cut transcription times in Ogun State courts in Nigeria and reduce patient documentation errors at C-Care hospitals in Uganda. For enterprises like ARM Investments, the draw is the ability to accurately transcribe complex financial jargon and Nigerian currency amounts that foreign models mangle.

***

Perhaps most critically for a continent wary of data privacy, Sahara v2 now offers offline deployment via a partnership with Nvidia, allowing sovereign governments and sensitive industries to run the AI behind their own firewalls.

“We’ve seen significant improvement in transcription and summaries,” said Ayo Oluleye, Head of Data at ARM Investments, in a statement. Meanwhile, Audere’s CPO Sarah Morris noted the APIs achieved “99%+ success rates” on Southern African accents during testing.

Voice is widely seen as the next great interface for the internet, particularly in regions where literacy rates vary or typing in local languages is cumbersome. If AI cannot understand the user, the user remains locked out of the digital economy.

Intron is proving it can build a model that outperforms the giants on its home turf. But as the infrastructure for African language AI shifts from “if” to “how,” the real challenge will be whether a startup with a team of under 20 can outrun the data centres of Big Tech and the open-source armies of academia.

How M-KOPA Put 5,000+ Electric Bikes On Kenyan Roads—Fast

By Henry Nzekwe  |  March 5, 2026

It’s a Thursday morning in Nairobi’s CBD, and the matatu stage is unusually quiet. Not because there are fewer bikes—there are plenty—but because the deafening roar of two-stroke engines is absent as the soft hum of electric motors soothes the air.

On one corner, a rider in a yellow helmet unlocks his Roam Air from a swap station. On another, a Bolt passenger climbs onto an Ampersand, barely noticing the absence of vibrations shaking her spine. This is the sound of Kenya’s electric vehicle revolution. And it’s moving faster than anyone predicted.

From a paltry 700 EVs in 2022, Kenya now boasts nearly 25,000 registered electric vehicles, according to the just-launched National Electric Mobility Policy. That’s a 3,000 percent explosion in three years. Most of these are motorcycles, the ubiquitous boda bodas that form the circulatory system of Kenya’s economy.

The government wants credit, and to be fair, it has earned some. Zero VAT on electric bikes and lithium-ion batteries. Reduced import duties. And, as of February 2026, green number plates that make EVs instantly recognisable.

“If you’re an electric bike in a stage, there’s a higher likelihood a customer will go for it,” Brian Njao, General Manager of M-KOPA Mobility, told WT. Visibility, it turns out, matters.

But beneath the feel-good environmental narrative lurks a paradox that keeps policymakers awake. The same revolution saving riders money is quietly blowing a hole in Kenya’s budget.

The maths of more money in your pocket

Here’s the part that matters to the man on the bike: electric works because it pays, not necessarily because it’s better for the environment, though that’s a welcome coincidence.

Njao, who formerly led Uber’s East Africa operations, breaks it down without jargon. A boda boda rider on a petrol bike typically pockets USD 20.00 to USD 40.00 a day before expenses. Switch to electric, and after financing repayments, swap fees, and everything else, the take-home jumps by an extra five dollars daily. Over a month, that’s groceries, school fees, or, in one rider’s case, moving a child to a better school.

M-KOPA has financed over 5,000 e-bikes since 2023 through its pay-as-you-go model, the same approach that put solar panels in millions of homes. Riders pay daily via mobile money. Miss a day, the bike locks. No accumulation of crippling debt.

“If that bike is not active on the road, that customer will not pay us,” Njao said. “We have a symbiotic relationship.”

He also shared that the repayment rates on the e-bike book sit above the market average, which is in line with M-KOPA’s other product lines. “That tells us the credit model we have built translates well into electric mobility,” he said.

Where the charger meets the policy

Bolt, the ride-hailing giant, now has 5,808 EVs on its platform, accounting for nearly a quarter of all electric vehicles in Kenya. More strikingly, 40 percent of Bolt’s two-wheeler fleet is already electric.

Njao described M-KOPA’s partnership with Bolt as straightforward; riders on the platform pay less for their loans, Bolt gets guaranteed supply, and the customer wins twice via lower asset costs and steady trip income.

Yet the infrastructure keeping those wheels turning belongs to the OEMs. Roam, Ampersand, and Spiro. They own the swap stations. They manage the batteries. M-KOPA just finances the bikes.

This division of labour creates a delicate dance. “It’s a chicken and egg scenario,” Njao admitted. “If you bring a thousand bikes without swapping stations, you’re stuck. If you spend on a thousand stations without bikes, your capex is gone.” The balance is precarious, and right now, demand is outpacing both.

The billion-dollar question nobody’s answering

Now for the part the government doesn’t put in press releases.

Kenya funds its roads through a fuel levy, KES 25.00 (19 cents) per litre of petrol. More EVs mean less fuel consumption. Less fuel consumption means collapsing revenue. The numbers suggest the EV transition already caused a KES 2 B (USD 15.4 M) shortfall in 2025. By 2043, that gap balloons to KES 89.5 B (~USD 688 M).

The Ministry of Roads projects fuel tax collections will start declining by 2037, just as the government needs more money for the very roads these EVs use. It’s a structural conundrum. Every electric bike Kenya celebrates inches the country closer to a fiscal cliff.

Transport Caninet Secretary Davis Chirchir acknowledges the problem, vaguely promising “alternatives” like road-use charges or electricity levies. But for now, the policy framework accelerating EV adoption contains no concrete plan for replacing the fuel money evaporating with every swapped battery.

Can Nairobi scale without breaking?

Njao is pragmatic. When asked about replicating Kenya’s model across Africa, he didn’t mention tax breaks or green plates first. He said: “Policy consistency. If governments commit to long-term local assembly incentives that hold for ten years or more, that would be transformative.”

The translation is that investors can survive high taxes, but not governments changing rules every budget cycle.

M-KOPA’s next moves are already mapped towards densifying Nairobi, launching Mombasa properly, then eyeing Uganda, Nigeria, and Ghana. The solar and smartphone business proved that the pay-as-you-go model works across borders. Njao believes mobility will follow.

“If we can have smartphones working in five countries, we can have electric mobility working there too,” he said.

Kenya’s mobility revolution is afoot. Thousands of EVs, USD 108 M in economic activity from ride-hailing platforms, thousands of riders earning more. The green transition is happening on muddy roads and crowded stages.

But revolutions consume their parents. The fuel taxes that maintain Kenya’s roads are evaporating, and no one has admitted what will replace them. The country is racing toward an electric future with a revenue model built for petrol.

For the rest of Africa watching—Nigeria with its oil addiction, Ghana with its gradual pilots, Ethiopia with its radical combustion engine ban—the task is to solve for tomorrow’s problems while celebrating today’s growth.

Njao is aware that riders aren’t thinking about fiscal policy, however. They’re calculating daily earnings, watching their savings climb, and quietly moving children to better schools. That’s the revolution they see.

The other revolution—the one involving USD 688 M in missing road money—will announce itself soon enough. By 2042, when Kenya projects EV sales will match petrol vehicles, the music stops. The question is whether anyone will have built a new chair.

Canal+ Pulls Plug On Showmax As African Streaming Losses Mount

By Henry Nzekwe  |  March 5, 2026

When African pay-TV giant, MultiChoice, relaunched its streaming platform, Showmax, in February 2024, the pitch was bold. Backed by Comcast’s NBCUniversal and powered by the same technology as Peacock, Africa’s homegrown streaming champion would finally take on Netflix on equal footing. The target was USD 1 B in revenue within five years.

Two years later, the plug has been pulled. MultiChoice announced Thursday it will discontinue Showmax following a “comprehensive review” by its board, citing “substantial annual losses” that proved unsustainable. The decision, first reported by Variety, ends an 11-year run that began in 2015 as a modest DStv companion and ended as a money pit that swallowed over ZAR 3 B (~USD 182 M) in investment.

For the 2025 financial year, Showmax recorded a trading loss of ZAR 4.9 B (USD 297 M), an 88% worsening from the previous year. Revenue, which peaked at ZAR 1 B (USD 60 M) in 2024, fell back to ZAR 800 M (USD 48.5), miles from the ZAR 18 B (USD 1 B) target executives had promised investors. Subscriber growth, while hitting 44% year-on-year, never translated into dollars.

“The substantial annual losses experienced by the Showmax business have proved unsustainable,” the company said in a statement, adding that no job cuts would result from the closure.

MultiChoice Group CEO David Mignot offered a blunt diagnosis earlier this year. “Financially speaking, business-wise speaking, the thing is not flying”.

Africa has roughly 600 million smartphones, he noted, but the economics of mobile streaming simply don’t work given data costs. Barely 4-5% of the continent’s electrified, TV-owning households have access to fibre. The streaming future executives had envisioned collided with market reality.

Canal+, which acquired MultiChoice in a USD 2 B deal last September, had telegraphed this outcome. CEO Maxime Saada told investors in January that Showmax was “not a commercial success—it’s quite obvious”. The platform’s losses were “not acceptable,” CFO Amandine Ferré added, as the French media giant pivoted toward cost synergies rather than streaming growth.

The group is targeting EUR 400 M (USD 463 M) in annual savings by 2030, and Showmax had become a prime candidate for cuts. NBCUniversal, which held a 30% stake in the joint venture, will now exit alongside MultiChoice.

The closure leaves African filmmakers and audiences grappling with another narrowed window, echoing moves by global streamers, such as Netflix and Prime Video, to pare down investments on the continent.

One South African director who produced multiple series for Showmax described the loss as devastating. “Showmax was one of the only platforms available to us that was willing to back stories that were bold and authentic… Losing Showmax is a huge blow to the local industry”.

MultiChoice says streaming remains “central to our strategy” and that it will continue investing in premium content. Canal+ is expected to expand its existing partnership with Netflix, which already bundles the streamer into pay-TV offerings across 24 African countries. A “super app” combining the group’s video services is reportedly in development.

But for the African streaming market, Showmax’s demise carries a sobering lesson. What was once positioned as Africa’s last great frontier for streaming growth became one of its most costly experiments.

Meta’s Smart Glasses Send Intimate User Footage To Kenyan Contractors, Investigation Finds

By Staff Reporter  |  March 4, 2026

When one sets down their Ray-Ban Meta glasses on the nightstand, the camera might still be recording. And halfway across the world, a contract worker in Nairobi could be watching.

An investigation by Swedish newspapers Svenska Dagbladet and Göteborgs-Posten has revealed that intimate footage captured by Meta’s AI-powered smart glasses—including people undressing, using the bathroom, having sex, and entering credit card details—is being reviewed by data annotators at Sama, a Kenyan outsourcing firm hired to train the company’s artificial intelligence systems.

The AI feature that enables this data collection cannot be disabled, the investigation claims. Users who activate the glasses’ assistant must agree to have their video and audio processed by Meta’s servers, where it may be forwarded for manual human review; a detail buried in terms of service that one worker said most users never read.

“In some videos, you can see someone going to the toilet, or getting undressed,” one Sama employee told journalists. “I don’t think they know, because if they knew, they wouldn’t be recording”.

Meta sold approximately 7 million pairs of the glasses in 2025, up from 2 million in 2023 and 2024 combined. The company has positioned the device as an “AI-powered assistant” that can translate languages, describe surroundings, and capture hands-free moments. What the marketing does not emphasise is that those moments may end up on a screen in Nairobi, annotated by workers earning wages far below Silicon Valley rates.

Sama, which has previously faced scrutiny over working conditions for content moderators reviewing Facebook posts, requires employees to sign strict non-disclosure agreements. Workers told Swedish media that Meta’s automatic blurring and anonymisation tools often fail in complex lighting, leaving faces and bodies exposed.

“With cameras in your house, you know where they are,” one annotator said. “These are glasses you wear on your face that keep recording when you take them off and set them on your nightstand”.

The revelations have reached European regulators. A group of 17 Members of the European Parliament from four political groups has formally questioned the European Commission about whether Meta’s practices comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which requires clear consent and transparency for data collection.

Under GDPR, companies exporting EU user data to countries like Kenya, which has not been granted “adequacy” status by the Commission, must implement additional contractual safeguards.

Sweden’s Civil Minister Erik Slottner has demanded answers, warning that the combination of location data and intimate imagery could create serious safety risks if mishandled.

Meta declined to answer specific questions from Swedish media but directed attention to its privacy policy, which states that “in some cases” human review may occur.

A spokesperson told The Telegraph: “When people share content with Meta AI, like other companies, we sometimes use contractors to review this data to improve people’s experience with the glasses, as stated in our privacy policy. This data is first filtered to protect people’s privacy”.

For the Kenyan workers who see these images daily, the psychological toll is compounded by contractual silence. Sama has previously been sued by a South African former employee, Daniel Motaung, who alleged that reviewing traumatic content for Facebook led to post-traumatic stress disorder. That case, which could establish Meta’s liability for conditions at outsourcing partners, is ongoing in Kenya’s Employment and Labour Relations Court.

“The day I found out my glasses were sending video to Kenya, I stopped wearing them,” one early adopter posted on social media. The post was viewed 2 million times.

Featured Image Credits: Svenska Dagbladet

Breadfast Co-Founder Breaks Protracted Silence Amid Investor Controversy

By Henry Nzekwe  |  March 3, 2026

For nine years, Muhammad Habib built Breadfast without ever writing a public post about the company. Not for marketing. Not for defence. “Not my style,” he said. But this week, the co-founder and COO of one of Egypt’s most valuable startups broke his silence.

In a lengthy Facebook statement posted Sunday, Habib addressed a controversy that has engulfed the e-grocery platform since it announced a USD 50 M pre-Series C funding round in February.

Critics on social media targeted Japanese investor SBI Investment, citing its ties to Vertex Israel, a Tel Aviv-based venture firm, arguing that companies operating in Arab markets should avoid indirect financial links to Israel amid the ongoing war in Gaza.

“We have refused money more than once when it conflicted with our moral boundaries,” Habib wrote, revealing that Breadfast had previously turned down capital from investors directly connected to the Israeli state. Those decisions, he said, were made unanimously by the founders in locked rooms where no one was watching.

The statement offered a rare window into the ethical calculations facing startups in a region where geopolitics and venture capital increasingly collide. Habib argued that international funds operate diversified portfolios across hundreds of countries and sectors, funding hospitals in Brazil, tech companies in India, and infrastructure in Europe.

When they invest in Egypt, he said, it signals confidence in the Egyptian market, not endorsement of a political position.

He also drew a distinction often lost in online boycott campaigns. “A boycott is for a company that has servers directly operating the occupation army, a company providing surveillance technology used against Palestinians, or a company with factories in settlements,” he wrote. “These companies directly contribute to the killings and displacements.”

Breadfast, founded in 2017 by Habib, Mostafa Amin, and Abdallah Nofal, has grown from a subscription bread delivery service into a vertically integrated commerce platform offering groceries, pharmaceuticals, and financial services. Private-label goods now account for roughly 40% of grocery sales, a strategy that has helped the company improve margins in Egypt’s high-inflation environment.

The USD 50 M round, led by Novastar Ventures through its People and Planet Fund III, included backing from Mubadala Investment Company, The Olayan Group, SBI Investment, Asia Africa Investment & Consulting, Y Combinator, IFC, EBRD, and 4DX Ventures. According to disclosures from Swedish investment firm VNV Global, which holds a 7.5% stake, Breadfast’s valuation has risen to approximately USD 403 M.

Habib emphasised that all investors hold minority stakes and that the company remains founder-led and Egyptian-controlled. “If you want Egypt to take its place in the world economy,” he wrote, “we must accept that global capital moves in an interconnected network.”

The controversy arrives at a sensitive moment for Egypt’s startup ecosystem. Over the past two years, currency devaluations, inflation, and reduced global venture appetite have created funding slowdowns and valuation pressure across North Africa [citation. Against that backdrop, Breadfast’s raise, and its reported valuation growth, stands out as a rare bright spot.

Breadfast is not alone in facing scrutiny over its investor lineup. In January, Nigerian defence-technology startup Terra Industries announced an USD 11.75 M seed round led by 8VC, the Silicon Valley firm co-founded by Joe Lonsdale, a co-founder of Palantir Technologies; a data-analytics company whose software is widely used by Western military and intelligence agencies. Alex Moore, a defence partner at 8VC and a Palantir board member, joined Terra’s board shortly after .

The connection drew criticism on social media, with some questioning whether a Nigerian company protecting critical infrastructure, including hydropower plants, mines, and industrial assets valued at approximately USD 11 B, should accept capital from investors with deep ties to U.S. defence and intelligence establishments.

Critics argued that foreign board members gain insight into Nigeria’s security vulnerabilities, infrastructure locations, and surveillance data, creating potential strategic vulnerabilities.

Terra’s co-founder and CEO Nathan Nwachuku has spoken about building “sovereign intelligence” and reducing African dependence on Western powers for security support.

Yet the company’s reliance on capital with ties to foreign intelligence, including an additional USD 22 M extension in February that brought total funding to USD 34 M, with participation from Flutterwave CEO Olugbenga Agboola, has sparked debate about whether financial sovereignty can coexist with foreign investor control

Habib acknowledged that not everyone will agree with his position. “I understand that everyone can look at this subject differently, and I completely respect this,” he wrote. “Each of us has a conscience and makes his decisions based on what he sees is right. My conscience is comfortable: I believe before God that what we are doing is the right thing.”

The company plans to use the funding to expand across Egypt, strengthen supply chain infrastructure, and explore new markets in North and West Africa, ahead of a larger Series C round expected in the first half of 2026. A potential global IPO remains a long-term ambition.

MTN’s Rebound In Nigeria Masks Growing Pains In Fintech Push

By Staff Reporter  |  March 2, 2026

MTN Nigeria has staged a dramatic financial recovery, reporting a full-year profit after tax of NGN 1.11 T (USD 810 B) for 2025, reversing the NGN 400 B (USD 292 M) loss it suffered the previous year.

The telecom giant’s revenue surged 54.9 percent to NGN 5.2 T (USD 3.79 B), fueled by a landmark 50 percent tariff hike approved in January 2025 and a long-awaited swing to foreign exchange gains.

For the first time since 2022, MTN posted a net foreign exchange gain—NGN 90.27 B (USD 66 M) for the full year, a sharp reversal from the NGN 925 B (USD 675 M) loss that had battered its books in 2024.

The naira’s relative stability, appreciating from NGN 1.535 K per dollar in December 2024 to NGN 1.475 K by September 2025, provided breathing room for a company long exposed to currency volatility.

“The 2025 financial year was described as a remarkable period of recovery and resilience for the firm,” CEO Karl Toriola said, noting that the turnaround enabled “accelerated network investment to enhance quality of service.” MTN invested over NGN 1 T in capital expenditure during the year, expanding base stations and fibre infrastructure.

But beneath the headline recovery, the company’s fintech ambitions tell a more complicated story.

On paper, MTN’s fintech division, which houses MoMo Payment Service Bank, appears to be firing on all cylinders. Revenue surged 72.5 percent in the first nine months of 2025 to NGN 131.6 B, roughly NGN 43 B per quarter. If spun off as a standalone entity, analysts noted, the unit would already command unicorn valuation.

Yet the growth in revenue has not translated seamlessly into user engagement. Active MoMo wallets declined 6.1 percent to 2.7 million in the first half of 2025 compared to December 2024, raising questions about the stickiness of the company’s financial services. The decline was even steeper earlier in the year; active wallets fell to just 2.1 million in the first quarter, a 55.6 percent year-on-year drop.

While the company added approximately 562,000 new wallets in the second quarter, suggesting a rebound, the dip exposed the challenge of converting MTN’s massive subscriber base—85.4 million customers and 51.1 million active data users—into habitual fintech users.

The fintech revenue growth itself requires closer examination. Industry analysts note that nearly all of the increase is driven by Xtratime, an airtime lending product where MTN lends subscribers credit to make calls when they run out. While classified as fintech revenue, it functions more as a high-margin convenience loan than a disruptive payment service.

Once airtime lending is stripped out, the rest of the fintech business—the part meant to compete with dominant players like Moniepoint and OPay—brought in just NGN 6.8 B in the first nine months of 2025. For a company reporting NGN 5.2 T in total revenue, that figure is hardly significant.

Notably, MTN’s mobile money business operates with restrictions. Its Payment Service Bank license allows it to accept deposits and move money but not to lend, the profitable core of fintech economics. This limitation puts MoMo at a structural disadvantage against pure consumer fintech competitors.

For the average Nigerian, the investment numbers matter less than the bars on their phone. A year after the 50 percent tariff hike, service quality remains erratic. Operators recorded over 40,000 network disruptions in 2025, including 19,000 fibre cuts and 3,200 equipment thefts.

“Last year, I spent NGN 5 K a month on data. Today, I spend NGN 8 K for the same volume, yet I still have to stand on my balcony to make a clear WhatsApp call,” Tunde Adeoye, a digital entrepreneur in Yaba, told The Guardian recently.

NCC Executive Vice Chairman Aminu Maida has signalled that 2026 will be “the year of consequences,” moving from encouraging investment to enforcing performance.

Moniepoint’s Mammoth Lending Machine Meets Messy Reality Of Two Big Defaults

By Henry Nzekwe  |  February 27, 2026

In January 2025, Alerzo, one of Nigeria’s most prominent B2B e-commerce startups, secured a NGN 5 B (~USD 3.6 M) working capital loan from Moniepoint Microfinance Bank.

The logic was sound. Moniepoint processes over 80% of in-person payments nationwide. Its terminals sit inside thousands of shops that Alerzo supplies. The fintech could see the merchants’ cash flows in real time: revenue, frequency, velocity. If data ever guaranteed a loan, this was it.

Twelve months later, Moniepoint was in court seeking permission to freeze Alerzo’s accounts. The outstanding balance stood at NGN 4.38 B (~USD 3.2 M), with interest still accruing. A Federal High Court in Lagos granted a Mareva injunction restraining every bank from releasing funds linked to the company or its principals. Videos surfaced online showing rows of Alerzo-branded vehicles parked at its Ibadan facility, reportedly being prepared for sale.

The founder, Adewale Opaleye, insists the company remains in operation and that only faulty vehicles are being cleared. “In fact, we still have over 400 vehicles that we are currently running,” he told local media. But when a court orders account freezes and asset disclosures, even routine fleet maintenance begins to look like triage.

Alerzo is not alone. Around the same time, Moniepoint’s microfinance arm quietly went to court seeking an order restraining every bank from dealing with funds held by Retail Supermarkets Limited, owners of the ShopRite franchise in Nigeria, over a NGN 2.4 B (~USD 1.7 M) working capital facility that had gone unpaid, notable tech insider Olumuyiwa Olowogboyega revealed.

That case, which unfolded late last year with far less public attention, targeted one of the country’s most recognisable retail chains with physical stores, steady foot traffic, and years of operating history.

Two borrowers, two different models, one lender now in court for both.

Moniepoint’s position is complicated. The unicorn, which raised over USD 200 M in its Series C round last year from investors including Development Partners International, Google’s Africa Investment Fund, and Visa, has built its lending model around payment data.

It disbursed more than NGN 1 T (~USD 735 M) in loans to small businesses in 2025, targeting provision stores, supermarkets, and building material traders that traditional banks typically ignore. Businesses that accessed credit, the company claims, recorded average growth of 36% after receiving loans.

The logic, analysts point out, is that if Moniepoint process a merchant’s payments, it knows their cash flow. If it knows their cash flow, it can lend against it. Payment data reveals capacity to repay.

But capacity is only half the equation. The other half, as Olowogboyega points out insightfully, is priority: whether, under pressure, a borrower will repay before other obligations.

“Payment data shows what merchants want you to see. It does not show what they route through other banks, what they owe elsewhere, or how a founder’s personal spending habits might drain the business when margins tighten,” he writes. In the ShopRite case, a well-known retail brand with decades of history still found itself unable to meet its obligations to a lender that had visibility into its operations.

Alerzo built its model on high-volume, low-margin distribution, supplying inventory directly to small retailers across Lagos, Oyo, and Ogun states.

The company raised roughly USD 20 M during the funding boom of 2020–2022, expanding aggressively. But B2B commerce in Nigeria is unforgiving. Maintaining hundreds of vehicles, paying drivers, warehousing goods, and absorbing fuel volatility created a cost base that proved difficult to sustain once venture funding slowed and the economy soured.

By 2023, Alerzo had laid off staff. By 2025, it needed bank debt to survive. Now, it faces a legal battle that will determine whether restructuring is possible or whether the company becomes another cautionary tale about the limits of debt in Nigeria’s startup economy.

Meanwhile, Moniepoint, while declining to comment, seems unlikely to soften its recovery stance. Allowing a high-profile default to slide would weaken its credit culture and invite similar behaviour from other borrowers.

The company continues to lend across retail, food services, and trade sectors. But each new loan carries the risk that the data powering the decision might be the ultimate until the moment it isn’t.

Alerzo insists it will release an official statement soon. Retail Supermarkets has not publicly commented on its case. With accounts frozen and assets under scrutiny, the question hanging over both borrowers is whether Moniepoint’s data-driven lending model can survive contact with the messy, unpredictable reality of Nigerian business.

Controversial Crypto Founder In Yet Another Ouster Echoing Past Scandals

By Henry Nzekwe  |  February 27, 2026

Ray Youssef, the controversial cryptocurrency entrepreneur who built two of Africa’s notable peer-to-peer trading platforms, has stepped down as CEO of NoOnes just over two years after founding it, the company confirmed this week, citing ongoing legal matters that remain undisclosed.

NoOnes, which Youssef launched in 2023 following the collapse of his previous venture, Paxful, announced on Thursday that its founder “does not participate in the management, operations, or decision-making of the platform.” The statement emphasised that “any legal matters involving Ray Youssef are personal and unrelated to NoOnes,” without elaborating on the nature of the proceedings.

Youssef had first announced his exit a week earlier on X, describing it as a difficult decision but offering no explanation. When contacted for comment, he had not responded to requests.

The departure marks the second time in three years that Youssef has left a company he founded under opaque circumstances. Paxful, once one of the world’s largest peer-to-peer bitcoin marketplaces boasting 1.5 million Nigerian users and USD 1.5 B in annual trade volume, shut down abruptly in 2023 amid regulatory scrutiny and a bitter legal battle with co-founder Artur Schaback.

At the time, Youssef blamed “key staff departures” and intensifying U.S. regulatory pressure on the peer-to-peer sector. But court filings later revealed a lawsuit between the co-founders, with allegations including mismanagement and governance failures. U.S. regulators, including FinCEN and the Department of Justice, subsequently fined Paxful for compliance lapses and handling transactions linked to suspicious activity.

The controversies surrounding Youssef extend beyond corporate governance. In 2016, he and a co-founder were arrested on charges of possessing firearms and cocaine, though the long-term disposition of that case remains unclear. Industry observers have also noted past allegations of substance use affecting leadership decisions, claims Youssef has never publicly addressed.

Since leaving Paxful, Youssef positioned NoOnes as a fresh start, a community-driven trading ecosystem targeting Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, where currency instability and limited banking access fuel demand for crypto alternatives. The platform grew rapidly, reporting over 2 million users and recording more than USD 4 M in daily trading volume shortly before his departure.

But in recent months, Youssef’s X feed has taken a markedly different turn. His posts have shifted toward overtly political and religious themes, including warnings about U.S.-Iran tensions, anti-Israel rhetoric, and references to divine protection, leading to questions about whether his focus had drifted from the company’s operations.

NoOnes has not named a successor or detailed its strategic direction post-Youssef. In a brief statement, the company said it remains “focused on delivering innovative crypto trading products while maintaining a secure, reliable, and user-centric environment.”

For the millions of African users who relied on Youssef’s platforms to move money across borders, the exit carries an uncomfortable echo. Paxful’s collapse left many scrambling for alternatives. Whether NoOnes can sustain its trajectory without its founder, and what legal clouds may yet surface, remains uncertain.

Cash Is Dying In Nigeria’s Nightlife Where Moniepoint Processed Over USD 600 M

By Henry Nzekwe  |  February 25, 2026

On a recent Sunday night at Amuludun Kitchen in Ipaja, a Lagos suburb, the plastic tables filled early. Olorunrinu, who owns the spot, watched her staff move between packed benches, delivering plates of pepper soup and cold bottles of water.

She had spent years building this spot into one of the neighbourhood’s busiest nightlife venues, but what she noticed now had less to do with food and more with how people paid.

“It’s rare to see cash,” she said. “We prefer transfer, or you can make payments with your card. The cash kind of exposes the staff to theft and all that.”

Her experience is increasingly the norm across Nigeria’s sprawling community nightlife sector. A new data-driven study by Moniepoint Inc., drawn from transaction records of more than 27,000 clubs, bars, and lounges on its payment network, reveals a sharp reversal of the wider informal economy’s cash dependency. While about half of all payments in Nigeria’s informal sector are still made in cash, the nightlife economy has gone digital.

In 2025, Moniepoint processed over NGN 900 B (~USD 665 M) for clubs, bars, and lounges, revealing the scale of the economic life that begins after sunset.

According to its latest study, bank transfers now dominate payments during peak nighttime hours, outpacing card transactions by nearly two million across Moniepoint’s network. Cash is actively discouraged, driven largely by operators’ security concerns. After dark, when crowds gather and attention scatters, carrying currency becomes a liability.

***

The data also reveals a precise rhythm to spending. Transaction volumes climb sharply from 8 p.m., peak before midnight, and then decline steadily even as venues remain full. For operators, the economic night ends earlier than the social one. The most critical window for staffing, restocking, and cash flow management falls between midnight and 6 a.m., when purchasing has already slowed but operational demands continue.

At De Synergi Lounge in Akonwonjo, manager Richard sees this pattern play out weekly. On usual nights, the existing team handles the flow. But during December, when crowds swell, “we get like two or three extra people to serve.” Across Nigeria, conservative estimates suggest at least 54,000 people work in nightlife-related roles every night, with local bars expanding their workforce by 30 to 50 percent on peak nights.

The sector’s geography defies easy assumptions. Lagos leads with 4,856 nightlife establishments on the network, followed by the Federal Capital Territory, Rivers, Delta, and Edo. But Katsina records the highest payment value for nighttime food trucks, pulling in over NGN 130 M (~USD 96 K) in the past year, while Kwara leads in transaction count. Nigeria’s night economy, the study shows, is distributed rather than concentrated in elite urban enclaves.

Tosin Eniolorunda, co-founder and group CEO of Moniepoint, said the findings should reshape how the sector is viewed. “Nigeria’s local bars and nighttime operators are not peripheral to the economy; they are a critical part of its architecture,” he said. “We see a substantial and sustained economic sector that employs hundreds of thousands of Nigerians every night and deserves the same attention we give to agriculture, healthcare, and retail”.

For operators like Olorunrinu, the shift to digital payments has also brought unexpected clarity. Real-time settlements mean she can track revenue as it happens, and Moniepoint’s POS terminals, each assigned a dedicated bank account number, provide instant audio confirmation when payments land, as there are no screenshots to verify, no alerts to wait for.

“That small ping changes everything,” the report highlights. The night can continue.

PayPal Promised Nigerians A Fresh Start — Users Say It Feels Like The Past

By Henry Nzekwe  |  February 24, 2026

When Precious received a USD 380.00 payment from a client in mid-February, she thought the long wait was finally over. The data analyst had linked her PayPal account to Paga weeks earlier, after the Nigerian fintech pioneer announced a landmark partnership with the U.S. payments giant, finally allowing users in the country to receive money after two decades of restrictions.

Then PayPal restricted her account.

“After filling everything, when money came in, PayPal still restricted the account,” Precious, who goes by @Prithee_p on X, posted on Feb. 19. “Now, they said they would hold the money till March 9 before releasing it despite filling out all their paperwork.”

She shared screenshots of her PayPal dashboard showing the hold. Her warning to fellow freelancers was blunt. “Avoid PayPal and Paga at all costs. Not only will you encounter unexpected issues, you’re at the risk of never receiving your funds.”

The same week, another user, Abdulaziz, who posts as @Utdpunter, received USD 290.00 from a client. PayPal closed his account immediately. When he appealed, the decision was final. His account was permanently deactivated, and his funds were caught in the company’s compliance machinery.

Tayo Oviosu, Paga’s founder and group CEO, responded directly to Abdulaziz on X. “We’ve had the opportunity to review with PayPal what happened and the decision made. While we cannot share the exact reasons, we are satisfied that the decision is a valid risk-based decision due to the behaviour observed on the account.”

For many Nigerians watching this unfold, the pattern felt painfully familiar.

PayPal first restricted Nigerian users in 2004, citing fraud concerns. For 22 years, Nigerians could only send money, never receive it; a policy that shut countless freelancers, digital creatives, and small businesses out of the global economy.

Over that period, workarounds emerged. Some used VPNs to mask their location. Others relied on friends abroad to receive payments and send funds through informal channels. Many simply lost opportunities.

The company attempted re-entry before. A 2014 partnership with First Bank enabled only outbound payments. A 2021 integration with Flutterwave helped businesses, but left individual users untouched.

This time, the company partnered with Paga, a 16-year-old Nigerian fintech that processed NGN 17 T (USD 12 B) in transactions in 2025. The promise was that Nigerians could finally link their PayPal accounts to a local wallet, receive international payments, and withdraw in naira. Oviosu had first pitched the idea to PayPal in 2013. It took 13 years to materialise.

Within hours of the January 27 launch, users reported the same problems that have plagued PayPal’s Africa operations for two decades. One user described logging in to test with a one-dollar payment. His account was immediately restricted. Another claimed to have submitted verification documents and was banned for life. Yet another described losing thousands of dollars between 2019 and 2021 after PayPal held his funds.

Oviosu pushed back against claims that the problems are widespread. “There is no widespread issue,” he told WT. “The complaints we’ve received so far largely relate to verification hiccups or immediate restrictions following initial deposits. In many cases, this suggests that PayPal’s internal compliance checks and automated risk monitoring systems are flagging certain activities for review.”

He noted that tens of thousands of users have successfully linked accounts and transacted without issue. “The average user has already withdrawn twice in just a few weeks,” he said. “The results are exceeding the initial expectations set by both our companies.”

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Paga has set up a dedicated email address for fully verified users experiencing issues. “We’re working with the PayPal team to support users who have unresolved issues actively,” Oviosu said.

The fintech vet also pointed out that the dual compliance process requiring both PayPal and Paga verification is designed to reduce risk flags while keeping the platform aligned with local regulations. PayPal’s global risk-scoring systems remain in operation, he added, as an industry-standard measure to protect users.

“Users experiencing blocks are usually prompted to submit documents and complete identity verification steps inside the PayPal app or dashboard. One of the issues we have seen are people taking the picture of an image of an ID versus the physical ID itself. That action is seen to be dubious and we are educating the public to not do so,” he told WT. In a separate post, he admonished users to desist from requesting money from strangers.

He added that Paga is investing in user education, and both companies have created dedicated resolution teams. For fully verified users with unresolved issues, the company is working with PayPal to escalate cases. Oviosu encouraged impacted customers to reach out via email for assistance.

But for some users, the damage is already done. “PayPal should be transparent with their procedures,” Precious, the data analyst from earlier, wrote. “Don’t make users think their account is okay, then limit or hold funds once received.”

The frustration is amplified by context. During PayPal’s long absence, Nigerian fintech companies built systems that work without mass account freezes. Paystack, which Stripe acquired for USD 200 M in 2020, processes billions in payments. Flutterwave, now valued at over USD 3 B, powers cross-border transactions across the continent. These companies filled the gap PayPal left behind.

Oviosu acknowledged the scepticism but defended the partnership. “Payment companies do their best to balance security and access, but this can sometimes result in unintended difficulties,” he said in a public note. “This partnership is about building a better path forward.”

For now, the path forward remains uneven. Some users are moving money smoothly. Others are watching funds sit frozen, waiting for a resolution that, based on two decades of history, may be slow to come.

Feature Image Credit:  NurPhoto via Getty Images