Triple Trouble: The Curious Case Of The Ouster And The Oddities At Lidya

By Henry Nzekwe  |  October 1, 2021

A couple of months ago, one founder’s curious statement raised eyebrows in the African startup/venture capital scene, and the words go something like this;

“I didn’t leave Lidya to pursue other projects. The existing investors took control of the company in an unjust manner. Therefore, I’m currently litigating them in the U.S.”

Those words make up Ercin Eksin’s unvarnished statement, included as an update to a TechCrunch article dated July 7, 2021, announcing Lidya’s USD 8.3 Mn pre-Series B raise while also casually mentioning that Eksin had “left Lidya to pursue other projects.” Eksin had rebutted.

When the above comment from Eksin (the Belgian national who had co-led the Nigeria-born SME financing startup known as Lidya as Co-Founder/Co-CEO since 2016) became public in July this year, it raised a lot of questions and virtually no concrete answers, naturally.

So, what really played out at Lidya? What sort of dispute culminated in Eksin leaving the startup under circumstances that appear to be far from amicable?

As it turns out, it’s quite the story; one littered with allegations of questionable practices and inappropriate behaviour. There are claims of “sketchy dealings”, as WeeTracker learned from sources, in the early-day foundational moves that essentially helped Lidya take off.

Besides that, the dispute-ridden circumstances surrounding the founding of Lidya is itself a point of discord that remains unresolved to this day.

It might help to think of the entire puzzle as a slightly complicated subject that can only be dissected with a three-pronged fork made up of the following; founder-investor discord, a previous startup squabble that was kept under wraps, and a curious partnership laden with questionable dealings that possibly gave Lidya its start.

First, a primer.

Per information gathered by WeeTracker, the bone of contention between Eksin and “existing investors’ ‘ is a cantankerous affair, no doubt. But there’s more to discover than Eksin’s recent troubles with Lidya’s investors.

Digging deeper, the recent issues appear to be another instalment of feisty founder-funder disagreements that Eksin and his Co-Founder, Akintunde “Tunde” Kehinde, have been collectively embroiled in before. Only, this time, Eksin is all on his own.

Once upon a time, Eksin and Kehinde were among the earliest executives at Africa’s biggest e-tailer, Jumia. In fact, the latter is generally described as the Co-Founder of Jumia Nigeria.

After leaving Jumia within months of each other, the duo linked up on a new startup. They co-founded a company known as Africa Courier Express (ACE) which delivers logistics solutions to both businesses and consumers; a business that may have been conceived during their spell at Jumia.

The Co-Founders would go on to start another company, Lidya: a digital lending business that serves SMEs in Nigeria and parts of Eastern Europe, which currently boasts 25,000 disbursed loans running into nearly USD 100 Mn. But the Co-Founder’s decision to jettison ACE and launch Lidya caused problems and left a trail of disgruntled investors.

Starting from the back end of 2016, Kehinde and Eksin got Lidya going in Nigeria with the former handling investor relations, commercial transactions, and external representation while the latter tended to operations, technology, product development, and finance. And the company would close a USD 1.3 Mn seed round by 2017. However, a few well-placed sources, privy to the situation remain convinced that the traction that gave the startup its seed round was the result of a questionable partnership.

L-R: Tunde Kehinde and Ercin Eksin, Co-Founders of Lidya and ACE
Source: Ventureburn

Come 2021, Eksin finds himself forced out of Lidya following a disagreement with investors while his long-time partner, Kehinde, now holds the reins as sole CEO with the blessing of investors, apparently.

“Tunde Kehinde is the CEO of Lidya. Tunde and the team are focused on growing Lidya’s operations in Nigeria, Poland and the Czech Republic. We continue to wish Ercin the best in his future endeavours,” says a Lidya spokesperson in a statement to WeeTracker.

In response to queries centred on the specific circumstances of Eksin’s ‘forced departure’ from Lidya, Lidya and its investors maintained that it is “a personnel matter that they cannot comment on publicly.”

On his part, Eksin told WeeTracker; “the case is currently in litigation therefore I can’t comment on the specifics at the moment.” 

As it turns out, Eksin is currently embroiled in a legal tussle with Lidya’s investors who he believes unjustly froze him out and subsequently removed him from the company.

Court documents obtained by WeeTracker tell a story of alleged misconduct, an internal investigation, and a unanimous decision.

Lifting the lid on Lidya

On Thursday, February 4, 2021, Eksin, through attorneys, Fox Rothschild LLP, filed an arbitration application in New York via the American Arbitration Association. For clarity, arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution that happens outside the courts, only in the face of very specific conditions consented to in a pre-existing agreement binding the disputing parties.

The respondents named include Lidya Holdings Inc., its investors (Bamboo Capital Partners, Accion Venture Lab, Flourish Ventures, Omidyar Network), as well as three “Outside Directors” who are essentially the investor representatives that, along with Kehinde and Eksin, make up Lidya’s Board. The Outside Directors named are: Ashley Lewis of Accion, Ameya Upadhyay of Flourish, Christian Ruehmer of Bamboo.

In Eksin’s arbitration application, it reads that although Lidya’s investors had dealt with him in bad faith since mid-2018, it was a “harassment” allegation that brought things to a flashpoint.

Eksin alleges that “unfounded” harassment allegations were laid against him in mid-2020 by a former Lidya employee who has close ties to one of the company’s investors. The nature of the alleged harassment is unclear but Eksin claims it had something to do with a disagreement over a demand for unearned incentives and he claims the allegations of harassment are baseless*. [ refer to the note in the footer]

In late 2020, investor representatives discussed terms with Eksin with regard to voluntary resignation. But those talks stalled due to Eksin’s demand for investors to buy out some or all his shares at a price he deemed satisfactory.

So, on January 12, 2021, the Lidya Board met telephonically to make a final decision with Eksin present. The Outside Directors – plus Kehinde – voted unanimously to terminate Eksin’s employment as Co-CEO effective the following day.

In Eksin’s application for arbitration, he claims he had been frozen out, removed as Co-CEO by investors who collaborated with a former colleague to take control of Lidya, pressured to vacate his position as a Director on the Board and deprived of participation in Board decisions, and frustrated out a USD 10 Mn funding opportunity that he had sourced.

Eksin also claims he had been willfully denied Directors and Officers Liability (D&O) insurance and employment agreement, subjected to a “one-sided” investigation, threatened and bullied by the investor group, and blocked out of his domain.com, AWS, and Google Workspace accounts by Lidya employees, including his former partner, Kehinde.

On the other hand, Lidya, its investors, and their representatives (i.e the respondents named in Eksin’s application) filed a Complaint as Plaintiffs against Eksin in the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware on February 8, in an effort to stop the arbitration request which the Plaintiffs describe as “meritless.” And their account of what transpired expectedly contrasts Eksin’s claims.

The plaintiffs contend that Eksin had been determined unfit and terminated as Co-CEO following thorough investigation and assessment in the face of “unreasonable demands, accusations, and threats by Eksin.”

It’s also stated that Eksin is well aware that he was employed at an at-will basis, which – according to the company’s bye-laws that Eksin approved and acknowledged – meant that he (Eksin) served at the pleasure of the Board and can be suspended by the Board with or without cause. Moreover, the Complaint mentions that Eksin was duly represented in the investigations and his termination followed due process.

The investors assert that Eksin had demanded extravagant buyout of his shares in exchange for departing the company on consensual terms but when he didn’t get his desire, he doubled down on his unfounded allegations aimed at coercing payment to which he is not entitled, and the arbitration request is similarly motivated.

Further, the Complaint denied Eksin’s claims that his status as a Director on the Board was threatened and it says that Eksin became belligerent and refused to fulfil fiduciary and contractual obligations which demand that he must return all the company’s property in his possession or control after his employment was terminated.

Several other points raised in the complaint oppose each of the claims Eksin made as either unfounded, false, or the product of a fertile imagination. As it stands, the dispute is an active legal matter ridden with motions, claims, counter-claims, and a plethora of reliefs sought.

In any case, it won’t be the first time Eksin and Kehinde have found themselves in the middle of some kind of conflict with investors.

Taking it all the way back

After their time at Jumia, Eksin and Kehinde joined up to launch ACE, their first company together.

ACE launched in Nigeria in 2013 and given that it was under the leadership of two individuals who, between them, boast glowing points like Harvard/Chicago education and a wealth of experience in both corporate and venture business, it seemed in good hands.

And it did appear so for a while as ACE would go on to raise a total of USD 3.3 in two rounds Mn by 2015, while doing the business of helping partners and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) ship things locally and globally.

But things didn’t stay ‘well-and-good’ for very long as Eksin and Kehinde hit a snag with ACE, disagreed with investors, and began to chase the idea that became Lidya.

Of course, ACE investors – which include Interswitch, Savannah Fund, the family offices of a number of local high net-worth individuals (HNIs), angel investors, and several friends of friends and associates of associates linked to Eksin and Tunde – kicked against it. But the Co-Founders continued with their new plans, mindless of possible agreement breaches and potential consequences.

Problems began to arise at ACE starting from 2016, not long after the Nigerian payments giant, Interswitch, shelled out USD 850 K (through its now-dormant USD 10 Mn ePayment fund for African startups), as part of a seed investment in ACE.

Soon after, it came to light Kehinde and Eksin were pursuing an opportunity in SME financing, though this was initially thought to be a vertical within ACE, according to an ACE investor.

However, as it became clear that the Co-Founders had, in fact, started a separate company, presumably with resources meant for ACE, the atmosphere changed.

One of the individuals who represent one of the investment firms backing ACE spoke to WeeTracker on condition of anonymity given that the case remains an open matter some six years later. According to this source, the Co-Founders were initially cloaky about the details of the new business, until a dispute with Interswitch brought everything into the light.

“We initially thought the SME financing play was an extension of ACE given that logistics and financing have a connection in SMEs. But we didn’t know this was not the case until Kehinde told us they were being pressured by Interswitch, which I assume had found out they were launching a new separate company. What he [Kehinde] told us when he reached out with a complaint was that Interswitch was trying to bully them and take over their company,” the investor representative said.

According to the source, before long, all of ACE investors learned what was amiss and everyone – except Kehinde and Eksin, it seems – understood the grievance of the investors.

“Eventually, they revealed that there were two companies, ACE and Lidya, and they were raising money for the two companies at the same time. It was really strange. At one point, Eksin made a preposterous comment that we [the investors] were treating them like slaves for questioning their actions. I think they felt entitled to the success and that made them rationalise every off-the-book thing they did once difficulties arose at ACE,” the source said.

Claims and counter-claims

A letter seen by WeeTracker (sent by Interswitch’s legal counsel to Kehinde and Eksin), dated January 23, 207, cites a material breach of the share subscription agreement by the Co-Founders while also instructing them (Kehinde and Eksin) to cease and desist operations under Lidya.

The document mentions that the Co-Founders have exhibited a flagrant disregard of the terms agreed to by failing to devote all of their time to ACE; inappropriate use of ACE’s resources (office space, equipment, personnel, and finance) for Lidya; and the diversion of business meant for ACE’s finance/business arm to Lidya [particularly a potentially lucrative business secured from First City Monument Bank (FCMB)].

In addition, the letter listed other breaches related to failure to hold annual general meetings and issue audited reports since December 2014 in contravention of Nigeria’s Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).

“Imagine my shock when HBS-educated Kehinde claimed he didn’t know that audited statements for ACE were mandatory. They kept acting like they didn’t understand why we were irritated,” the source mentioned.

“He [Kehinde] later told me that they started Lidya because they thought it would be easier to raise money for a fintech. In my view, they just knew they could get away with such a thing here. I think it all comes down to the fact that building a financing business required them to raise more funding; they knew raising more capital for ACE would dilute them further, so they decided to launch a whole new company,” the source claimed.

Eksin’s take on this matter is that ACE was a few months away from bankruptcy in the midst of an economic crisis in Nigeria and existing investors did not want to put in additional financing.

“We updated all the ACE investors proactively at the time in which they were fully aware that without further backing of the company, the company faces liquidation yet they chose not to invest further,” he told WeeTracker. Kehinde did not comment on this matter.

As the situation worsened, they got started with Lidya, and Eksin claims they did not use ACE’s resources for Lidya, and they informed ACE’s investors that they won’t be running ACE day-to-day, and even got some of ACE’s investors to back Lidya.

Eksin also claims audits were conducted on ACE’s accounts by EY and KPMG and no irregularities were discovered, though he wouldn’t share any supporting documentation, citing confidentiality clauses. Moreover, affected parties dispute this and maintain that the Co-Founders always sought to obfuscate.

A tumultuous time

A source from the ACE investor camp stated that they had refrained from putting more money into the startup due to the lack of consensus on a forward path and disagreements over the company’s spending on a foreign contractor at a time when currency exchange rates were very unstable in Nigeria.

The source also mentioned it had initially appeared that a financing arm under ACE was the way forward until it was discovered Eksin and Kehinde had chosen an option that is most convenient to them by launching Lidya as a separate company.

“After we heard about Lidya’s successful fundraiser, they initially said they were going to run the businesses together. We proposed maybe one being CEO of ACE, and the other being CEO of Lidya. That offer was rejected. They haven’t explained the choice to leave ACE investors out of Lidya. Jack Dorsey leads Square and then they created CashApp as a subsidiary of Square. Why couldn’t they have done a structure like that?,” said the source. 

“For example, they could have created Lidya as a wholly-owned subsidiary of ACE and then raised for Lidya. They are presenting this like there weren’t options. I know that Eksin and Tunde know that there are multiple legal structures they could have explored. They chose the one that was most convenient for them,” the source added.

In response, Eksin argues no harm, no foul.

“If they really believed that we did something against the agreements and/or did something illegal, they could have easily taken legal action. There were some investors that were upset, especially the ones that didn’t invest in Lidya at the time. But ‘upset’ doesn’t mean the launch of Lidya is illegal or unethical. Those investors demanded free shares in Lidya because they backed us in ACE and we refused, that’s why they were upset,” he says.

Addressing this, another ACE investor representative told WeeTracker that only one or two ACE investors committed fresh capital to Lidya with the overwhelming majority shortchanged by the Co-Founders.

This source also mentioned that ACE’s investors opted to keep the matter quiet in the hopes of a resolution that is yet to happen to this day. As was explained, the matter has been kept under wraps and the parties involved opted not to go to the courts for reasons mostly tied to optics.

“As a lot of the investors are Nigerian HNIs, they felt uneasy during this conflict with the Co-Founders because they felt it would look like a bunch of older, powerful Nigerians bullying a young startup. I thought it was silly and this is where I actually disagree with the group,” the source said.

“The legal point has also been addressed. Investors don’t really want to. That doesn’t mean that what they did wasn’t in breach of a contract. Frankly, it doesn’t even mean that investors don’t think they breached contract. It simply means that investors don’t want to sue,” the investor representative reiterated.

According to persons familiar with the matter, there’s been a few feeble attempts to set things right with ACE and disgruntled investors in the past year or so, but nothing concrete has emerged as of yet.

Besides all these happenings at ACE, questions have also been raised about the early dealings through which Eksin and Kehinde possibly got Lidya off the ground.

Something to ponder

Back in 2013, Kehinde, Eksin, and a certain Polish national named Marek Zmyslowski crossed paths while they were all employed at Africa Internet Group (AIG), which eventually became Jumia.

One by one, they all moved on from Jumia eventually. And by the time they reconnected in 2016, Eksin and Kehinde were in the process of jettisoning ACE for Lidya while Zmyslowski was making progress with HotelOga [also Hotel Technology Solutions (HTS)]; a hotel booking platform he had set up in Nigeria having previously been employed at Jovago (a fringe AIG unit which later became Jumia Travel and has since been offloaded by Jumia).

While Kehinde and Eksin were engaged in founder-funder troubles of their own given the ACE/Lidya squabble, Zmyslowski would himself become the centre of a messy affair later on.

Marek Zmyslowski
Source: NewswireNGR

This ‘messy affair’ is ridden with mountains of evidence backing claims from the investors who backed HotelOga that he (Zmysłowski) defrauded investors, brokered questionable deals, and siphoned off tens of thousands of dollars in company funds into his private account. Of course, Zmyslowski claims the opposite, alluding to a gang-up against him, though he has since departed Nigeria.

In any case, there is also evidence that Zmyslowski went behind their backs to make deals to sell the company and that he ran a Polish-registered entity, Hotel Online sp. z.o.o, where the hotel management software platform’s intellectual property (IP) was held, unbeknownst to HotelOga investors who were willfully kept in the dark through the designs of Zmyslowski and his Polish associates, including HotelOga Co-Founder, Maciej Prostak, and a group of Polish investors, plus an East African hospitality company.

(All these details will be treated in a separate story after WeeTracker gathers more information.)

Now, back to ties that bind Lidya and HotelOga.

According to Eksin, Lidya started by financing the invoices of the suppliers of the large businesses.

“We reached out to large companies as well as SMEs, that’s how we acquired the initial set of customers,” he says.

Starting from 2016, HotelOga became one of Lidya’s first clients and the arrangement was such that Lidya financed HotelOga’s operations by providing short-term loans against HotelOga invoices.

“Big OTAs like Expedia paid HotelOga in 60 days for clients bookings after the client hotel check-in, while HotelOga had to pay the hotel before the hotel check-in. HotelOga was still a startup without funding to secure this cashflow, which is why we used Lidya financing services,” Zmyslowski tells WeeTracker.

In the same vein, Eksin recalls they agreed that Lidya will finance the hotels directly at the point of guest check-in and HotelOga will pay back to Lidya after 30 days once they receive the payment back from Expedia.

“HotelOga and Expedia had an agreement at the time that HotelOga would process the payments for the hotels unless they explicitly choose to process on their own that’s why they were getting paid directly from Expedia,” Eksin tells WeeTracker.

“HotelOga decided to offer interest-free loans to the hotels to acquire them faster. As the project was a big success, after a few months, we signed an agreement with Expedia, HotelOga and Lidya to provide the loans directly to the hotels against the Expedia bookings and Lidya would start to process the payments directly with Expedia to scale the project,” he adds.

At that time in 2016, Lidya was just as much a fledgling startup as HotelOga, and it remains unclear how Lidya was capable enough – in terms of technological/financial structure – to assess risk and underwrite such loans to another startup that was just starting out.

But perhaps Lidya didn’t need to do all that as Lidya’s Co-Founders and Zmyslowski were noted by former employees to be chummy enough that Zmyslowski ditched HotelOga original offices despite the pricey lease and moved HotelOga’s operations to Lidya’s offices, even though it added another NGN 300 K to the monthly burn rate.

Also, WeeTracker gathered that Zmyslowski made the unilateral decision to handover the credit/receivables/payment processing business to Lidya despite established interest from investing partners who had put additional capital into a cash-strapped HotelOga based on the understanding that the investing partners would handle the payments side and other ancillary products and services that serve HotelOga’s customer base.

A deep source mentioned that Zmyslowski gave the business to Lidya and the terms of the deal are confounding.

“Without discussion and approval and in the absence of documentation, he borrowed NGN 22 Mn from Lidya. HotelOga was making only 2-4 percent on every booking, yet Lidya was charging HotelOga an average of 9.9 percent a month on the loans, which annualised is about 55 percent with some as high as 206 percent. It was a ridiculous rate for us but phenomenal for Lidya,” the source says.

“Also, I wonder how a technically-yet-to-fully-launch Lidya – which only kicked off in Nigeria after November 2016 – shelled out NGN 22 Mn. Who takes ~USD 70 K on a single name or credit risk that also happens to be a startup? Don’t even get me started on the regulatory hurdles to extend such a loan,” the source adds.

Be that as it may, WeeTracker learned from a source that Zmyslowski suddenly demanded that the sum of NGN 10 Mn be made to Lidya immediately without an invoice on January 24, 2017.

When HotelOga’s financial controller refused to oblige due to a feeling of suspicion and discomfort given the lack of transparency and documentation, as well as the sudden urgency of the request and Zmyslowski blatant refusal to attempt to restructure the payment with Lidya, Zmyslowski unceremoniously fired the finance official on February 3, 2017.

It was then communicated that Lidya, which had gotten itself in a position to collect payments for HotelOga, had no problems deducting what it was owed from the source: money collected by Lidya for HotelOga from big OTAs and other channels, which would result in HotelOga failing to pay the hotels on its platform.

According to the source, HotelOga was forced to make a payment of around NGN 6 Mn to Lidya to avoid disruption of its business but company officials remained suspicious of a “backdoor arrangement” between Zmyslowski and Lidya’s Co-Founders who were battling with ACE’s investors over Lidya at the time.

It was a point of concern that HotelOga funds might seed a disputed venture and expose HotelOga to litigation. Moreover, records had shown Lidya was paying Zmyslowski’s personal hotel expenses and passing the bill to HotelOga as of December 2016. It did seem like something wasn’t right.

As it turns out, authentic bank records seen by WeeTracker show that on February 16, 2017 – just two weeks after HotelOga’s finance personnel was forced to make that NGN 6 Mn payment to Lidya – Eksin, Lidya’s Co-Founder, personally wired USD 5,018.oo as “seed capital” into a Polish bank account belonging to Hotel Online, the previously mentioned Polish entity set up by Zmysłowski and Prostak, which actually owned the core technology and IP that HotelOga depends on.

Zmyslowski is said to have initially concealed the Polish entity from investors who backed the Nigerian entity, HotelOga, which by itself is little more than a shell company with contracts with Nigerian hotels and no technology.

By March 2017, Lidya announced a USD 1.3 Mn seed round, weeks after the loan issue with HotelOga and a strange ~USD 5 K payment made by Lidya’s Co-Founder to a foreign entity tied to Zmyslowski, who also happens to be HotelOga’s Co-Founder/CEO.

One source told WeeTracker that the relationship between Zmyslowski and Lidya’s Co-Founders was an “unholy union” that seeded Lidya.

“They got traction by playing dirty with Marek and claiming HotelOga’s customers as their own so that investors would be nudged to invest in Lidya. It’s always been fishy from the start, that’s why Lidya is now in Poland and Czech Republic even though it’s supposed to be a lending platform for African SMEs,” the source argued.

On their part, Eksin and Zmyslowski both maintain that the ~USD 5 K direct transfer which Eksin made to the Hotel Online account in 2017 was an angel investment, and that the early loans to HotelOga came with the best terms in the market with all the necessary approvals obtained – something that former HotelOga officials dispute.

As a side note, Zmyslowski initially claimed he had no recollection of the wire transfer from Eksin but eventually recalled and confirmed the transaction after a follow-up by WeeTracker.

When queried as to why he was never listed among Hotel Online shareholders in public company documents available online from the Polish public register (given that he invested in the company), Eksin says he never received his shares though he wouldn’t volunteer any documents to authenticate an angel investment deal or a trail that can be used to establish funding talks with Hotel Online.

“As I believed in the potential of HotelOga and Marek was raising financing for his company at the time, I decided to invest in his company and wired UD 5 K as an angel investment. I ended up never receiving my shares. Unfortunately, that was the only sour angel investment that I had in Nigeria,” he says.

As for how the then-beleaguered Lidya was able to bankroll HotelOga to such an extent in the beginning, the embattled Lidya Co-Founder maintains Lidya was launched with financing from himself, Kehinde, and ACE investors that opted to also back Lidya. However, question marks would probably continue to linger.

——————————————————————————————————————

NOTE: This is a developing story and is based on the accounts of persons involved in the matter. This article is an aggregated version of claims made by all the parties and WeeTracker takes no responsibility for wrong information provided by any of the parties.

*As per a document seen by WeeTracker, the harassment case against Ercin Eksin could not be established by a subcommittee’s informal findings.

South Africa’s AI Paradox Has Near-Universal Use And Near-Zero Proof

By Staff Reporter  |  November 18, 2026

Nine in ten large South African organisations now use generative AI in some form. That is up from 45% two years ago, tracking an adoption curve that looks like a stampede. But the same research house that tracked that surge has attached a number to what comes next, and the number is concerning. The value pillar of the new SA AI Index scores South Africa at 16.6 out of 100. The average organisation scrapes together a total index score of 34.3.

The study, conducted by World Wide Worx with Altron Digital Business, surveyed 100 decision-makers at firms employing more than 200 people. It found that 73% of organisations have no tools to assess whether AI delivers value. Another 71% cannot put a figure on the cost savings AI supposedly generates. Only 27% can measure value at all.

Arthur Goldstuck, World Wide Worx’s chief executive, put the gap in plain terms. “Using AI and getting value from it are very different things,” he said. “Today almost everyone uses AI, often in a shallow way, and many organisations are discovering that a language model on every desk does not automatically translate into business results”.

The collapse in confidence is steep. Positive ratings for AI’s impact on productivity fell from 96% in 2024 to 51% this year. Positive assessments of competitiveness dropped from 86% to 37%, and customer service from 66% to 38%. TechCentral noted that earlier World Wide Worx figures combined “positive” and “very positive” responses, and it is not yet clear whether the 2026 numbers use the same basis. The direction of travel, however, is not in dispute.

The firms getting results look different from the rest. Among the 30% with AI live in core business processes, 80% report a positive productivity impact. Among those still experimenting, that figure falls to 44%. Among ad hoc users, it is 6%. Only 6% of organisations with AI in production report a positive effect on profit.

There is a governance problem layered on top. 75% of organisations report unofficial “shadow AI” use, up from 52% in 2025. A third cannot point to any formal AI control. Craig Stewart, managing director of Altron Digital Business, said the gap is between “having AI and having it at the heart of the business”.

The measurement vacuum is not unique to South Africa. A separate ITWeb survey this year found 36% of local organisations do not measure AI return on investment at all, and only 13% do so consistently. The difference is the scale of the adoption wave now crashing into that blind spot.

Trapped Customer Funds At Raven Expose The Ugly Side Of Nigeria’s Fintech Boom

By Staff Reporter  |  November 16, 2026

A single customer complaint has cracked open a wider problem in Nigeria’s digital banking sector. More than NGN 17 M (USD 12.6 K) belonging to a Raven user known on X as Legacy remains stuck after he tried to liquidate a fixed deposit. The platform first returned a message saying “Transfer failed, please try again later,” then cited maintenance for months, and eventually showed a zero spendable balance while still displaying the funds.

Legacy says he put his money into Raven after a public endorsement by Chinonso Egemba, the health influencer widely known as Aproko Doctor, who served as the company’s brand ambassador. That detail has turned a liquidity failure into a public argument about who carries responsibility when a fintech app stops working as advertised.

Raven’s chief executive, Uchenna Nnodim, has told customers that the disruption followed the withdrawal of a banking partner’s operating licence. A portion of customer funds sat with that partner, which cut Raven’s liquidity and its ability to process withdrawals. The partner was Beststar Microfinance Bank, identified in Raven’s own app listing, and its licence was among 46 revoked by the Central Bank of Nigeria effective July 1, 2026.

The company says it is pursuing two recovery paths. It is engaging regulators to recover funds held with the former partner and raising fresh capital to settle customer obligations. It has also split balances on its app so that old funds remain visible but restricted while new deposits sit under a separate “Usable Balance”. Nnodim has said more than 650,000 customers have regained access, but Raven has not disclosed how much money remains trapped, set a repayment date, or provided an aggregate figure for restricted funds.

Aproko Doctor says his ambassadorship ended in 2024 and that he is not an owner, shareholder, employee or representative of Raven. In a statement pinned on X, he said his recommendations reflected his own experience at the time. “When I recommend a product, I am giving my honest view of it at the time I recommend it,” he wrote. “That recommendation cannot guarantee how a company will behave years later. And it does not make me responsible for a business I do not run.” He urged affected customers to file written complaints with Raven and escalate unresolved cases to the CBN’s Consumer Protection Department.

Activist Martins Vincent Otse, known as Verydarkman, rejected that position and pointed to a 2025 post in which Aproko Doctor appeared to promote Raven, contradicting the claim that the deal ended in 2024. “Meaning you are lying,” Verydarkman said in an Instagram video. Legacy has since told Verydarkman that Raven released his money in instalments after the complaint gained traction, but other customers remain locked out.

Separately, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has charged a man over an alleged NGN 700 M (~USD 520 K) fraud involving the bypass of two-factor authentication on Ravenpay user accounts between March 2025 and January 2026. The case has no direct link to the liquidity crisis, but it adds to questions about operational controls at a platform that marketed itself as a safe home for savings.

Raven, on its part, has committed to publishing a formal progress update every two weeks on its recovery process and the steps being taken to settle outstanding customer balances. “We will also keep engaging affected customers directly and giving them honest, accurate information about their own cases,” it said in a statement issued today.

As it stands, the CBN’s consumer protection department is the only body with the power to compel a resolution, and for thousands of Raven customers, that inbox is now the last available recourse.

Africa’s AI Startups Face A Cost Trap As Expenses Dwarf Earnings

By Staff Reporter  |  November 13, 2026

African artificial intelligence businesses have attracted USD 1.3 B in disclosed funding over the past decade, but a new industry survey suggests the capital is colliding with a hard economic truth. Building and selling AI in Africa remains a structurally expensive proposition, and the gap between global input costs and local purchasing power is threatening the sector’s next stage of growth.

The report, “AI Made in Africa: Voices from AI businesses across Africa“, published by German development agency GIZ and data firm Briter, mapped 311 AI ventures across the continent. The headline funding figure masks a far leaner reality. The median funding ticket is just USD 225 K, roughly a third of the companies remain entirely bootstrapped, and only 15% are profitable. More than 75% of all capital raised has gone to businesses founded before 2020, leaving newer AI-native startups to operate in a funding environment shaped by an older generation of raises.

The core problem is a price mismatch that runs through every layer of the business. For 65% of surveyed companies, cloud computing, GPUs and AI infrastructure are their largest development expense, and those bills are denominated in US dollars at rates comparable to markets in Europe or the United States. Yet more than half of these businesses price their products below USD 2.5 K a year per customer, roughly USD 208.00 a month. That is a sum that, for many small African enterprises, competes directly with internet access, generator fuel or staff salaries.

The infrastructure deficit behind those costs also poses a headache. Africa holds less than 1% of global data-centre capacity while hosting about 18% of the world’s population, meaning most AI computation for African companies runs on foreign servers.

Moreover, currency shocks amplify the squeeze. The 2023 naira devaluation reportedly drove local cloud bills up by 224% for some Nigerian users, and founders now describe devaluation as a permanent operating risk rather than an exceptional event. A company serving thousands of daily users can spend USD 20 K to USD 50 K a month on third-party AI APIs alone, costs that scale with success rather than flattening out.

Selling into this environment carries its own costs. The survey found that 65% of businesses identify customer trust and AI literacy as their top scaling barrier, ahead of development costs. Many global models perform poorly on African data because they were trained on foreign datasets, forcing companies to spend time and resources demonstrating reliability to sceptical buyers. Government sales, which 44% of the companies pursue, can take 12 to 18 months to close, stretching cash flow for startups that need regular revenue to survive.

The talent market adds another expense. Africa accounts for roughly 1% of the global AI talent pool, and 51% of surveyed founders say senior AI research roles are the hardest to fill. Nearly half have responded by building internal training pipelines, effectively becoming educators as well as technology companies.

The businesses are not asking for sympathy, the report notes, but for patient capital that understands the operating environment, and for public interventions that lower input costs rather than simply celebrating the sector’s growth. Whether that capital and those policies arrive will determine if Africa’s AI economy can move from a promising experiment to a sustainable industry.

Image Credits: AfDB

Newcomers Are Tinkering With New Models To Replace Uber In Nigeria

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 12, 2026

The scramble to replace Uber in Nigeria is being fought over who absorbs the cost of a trip, and the new entrants are making bets that Uber itself could not sustain.

Uber ended operations in Nigeria on September 2 after twelve years, leaving behind a market worth about USD 450 M in 2025 and projected by Ken Research to reach USD 982 M by 2032. Bolt and inDrive moved quickly to absorb riders and drivers, but a cluster of newer and local players is now testing structurally different models. Loop, FastDrive, SimpliRide and Shuttlers are shaping up as not merely cheaper versions of Uber but experiments in who pays when the fare does not cover the journey.

The most aggressive of these is Loop, which launched in Port Harcourt and Delta State in October and says drivers keep 100% of their fares, paying the platform through a subscription rather than a per-trip commission. FastDrive, founded by Okechukwu Mathew and launched publicly on October 15, takes a related route. Drivers set their own per-kilometre price within limits, pay no percentage commission, and owe a flat NGN 1 K (about 74 cents) daily fee after their first two rides.

On a strong day, the appeal is straightforward. A driver on a 25% commission who grosses NGN 40 K (~USD 30.00) hands over NGN 10 K (USD 7.43). On FastDrive, the same driver pays less than a dollar, provided the rides arrive. But the risk has not disappeared. Under a commission model, the platform earns less when the driver earns less. Under a subscription or a daily fee, the driver owes the platform whether the day is good or bad. A fuel queue, a police checkpoint, a breakdown, a slow Monday, and the fixed cost is still due. The model that looks most driver-friendly on a busy day can be the least forgiving on a quiet one.

inDrive’s recent move is the clearest admission that pure negotiation has a ceiling. The company built its Nigerian business on letting riders name a fare and drivers accept, reject or counter, charging a service fee of about 10%. It insists the bidding model is intact.

“Our model is the same. We didn’t change overnight. We just introduced the One Click option, which lets you skip bidding if you are in a hurry,” the company says. But One Click removes the negotiation and lets inDrive set the price. Fares on One Click run roughly 40% to 50% higher than the recommended fares on the basic ride category, an observation of the app reflects, though the option may be a way to help drivers earn more without leaving them to riders who bid below acceptable levels.

***

Shuttlers is not competing inside that same on-demand frame. The company has run scheduled shared buses in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt since 2016, completing more than 10 million journeys and operating over 430 buses daily. In September, shortly after Uber’s exit, it launched Shuttlers Pod, a door-to-door car service that carries three to four commuters who book in advance and share the vehicle, with a fixed fare and no surge pricing or roadside negotiation.

Pod trips cost roughly 50% less than typical ride-hailing fares, enabled by advance booking and shared occupancy. “Nigeria’s cost of living is rising faster than incomes,” chief executive Damilola Olokesusi said at the launch. “With that reality, the smartest way to move people is through shared mobility”.

The challenge these entrants are trying to surmount is the one that broke Uber. A report by Obi, a California-based price and trip data aggregator, found that Uber paid drivers more than it charged passengers on trips shorter than roughly 20 kilometres, with the gap reaching 23% on journeys between 5km and 9km. Nigerian Uber drivers averaged 130 rides over the first seven months of 2026, against 1,142 for Uber drivers in South Africa, an 8.8-fold gap in per-driver volume. “Low per-driver volume plus a per-ride subsidy is a bad combination: there’s no scale to absorb the loss,” the report said.

Fuel has not helped. Petrol has risen from about NGN 830.00 a litre to roughly NGN 1.4 K, a near-70% increase in the single largest operating cost, while platform commissions on the established apps have stayed between 20% and 35%. Bolt’s Nigeria driver guide lists a 20% commission, and the Amalgamated Union of App-Based Transporters of Nigeria has demanded a 10% cap and a fare review, staging a strike in October that shut down the Bolt and inDrive apps in Lagos.

Bolt, which held the largest share of Nigeria’s market by the time Uber left, recorded a 92% week-on-week increase in Nigerian driver registrations after the exit. inDrive saw app installs surge 96%, according to local reports. But Ayoade Ibrahim, co-founder of the drivers’ union, warned that reduced competition over time could lead to less favourable terms for both riders and drivers, and that the platforms that last will be the ones that can hold a fare high enough for drivers and low enough for riders while still funding support, insurance and compliance.

That is the unresolved question at the centre of Nigeria’s ride-hailing reset. Subscriptions make drivers pay upfront while daily fees make them pay regardless. Meanwhile, One Click quietly concedes that negotiation alone underprices the work and shared scheduled rides avoid the problem by selling a different product. None of these models has yet demonstrated that it can carry the full weight of on-demand mobility at scale in a market where fuel, inflation and currency have already broken one global operator.

The Unlikely Rise Of A Sickle Cell Survivor Behind A Data Centre & Tech City In Nigeria’s Overlooked Region

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 11, 2026

The meeting nearly ended with Ugi Augustine Ugi thrown out of the room. It was 2016, and he had come to tell the Calabar Carnival Commission that its biggest annual event was leaving money on the table. Why, he asked, did a festival that drew 100,000 people a day still depend on government funding every year? Why not merchandising, a streaming economy, commercial sponsors?

“They were not ready for that conversation,” Ugi tells WT. Nearly a decade later, his company runs the carnival’s digital registration, voting and stakeholder systems.

That persistence runs through Nugi Group, the company Ugi founded in 2016 in Calabar, a port city in Cross River State in southern Nigeria. It also explains a business that has grown by taking on problems others avoided, often in places others ignored.

Ugi was born with sickle cell anaemia. The illness shaped his first ambition. He wanted to become a doctor because he wanted to help people like himself. “Medicine made sense to me as a child because of what I was living with,” he says.

The pivot came in secondary school at the West African Peoples Institute in Calabar, where he was a laboratory prefect. In 2004, a telecoms engineer arrived to install computers. Ugi kept asking questions about the internet and how the systems worked. Those conversations opened a door that medicine could not close. He later realised he had not abandoned the original impulse. “I still wanted to solve problems and improve people’s lives,” he says. “Technology simply became the tool I chose to do it.”

By 2006 he was learning web development on a partial scholarship and working in a cybercafé. His parents, both civil servants, were not impressed. Technology, in their view, was a path to becoming a secretary, he said in a previous interview in which he also revealed that he entered a televised game show on his father’s phone, won NGN 20 K (around USD 155.00 at the time) , and used his share to pay for a programming course. He never collected the certificate after a dispute over e-books, but he kept the knowledge.

***

Nugi nearly did not survive its early years. The company grew to 23 employees, then shrank to five as clients paid late and deals collapsed. “The most dangerous thing an early-stage company can do is grow its headcount before it’s grown its revenue discipline,” Ugi tells WT.

The near-death experience hardened the company. Every hire, product and partnership, he emphasised, had to justify itself. There were other low points, including a major health setback that forced him to pause almost everything. He wrote about that period in a memoir, Blood of the Phoenix.

What Nugi built instead was a business anchored in government contracts, an unusual path for a Nigerian tech company seeking scale. It took on revenue administration, land management and citizen services for Cross River State.

The founder says its systems helped the state grow internally generated revenue, the taxes and fees the state collects itself rather than federal handouts, by 60.6% to NGN 36.3 B between June 2023 and May 2024. By December 2024 the figure had reached NGN 46 B. More than 7,500 land files have been digitised, and certificate-of-occupancy processing has been cut to 21 days for government land.

The numbers are looking up, though the causal chain is harder to verify. Revenue can rise because software closes leakages. It can also rise because enforcement tightens, tax rates change, or inflation pushes nominal receipts up. Nugi’s biggest client is also its biggest concentration risk given that state budgets tend to move with oil receipts and political priorities. A change of governor can change a vendor’s fortunes overnight.

Ugi is aware of the scepticism. He points to Cally Air, the state-owned airline, as an example of what he means by government needing expertise rather than cash. “Five aircraft, no naira of government funding, yet flying on goodwill to build a sustainable, independent business model,” he says.

Cally Air is owned by the Cross River State government, and the state procured its fleet. Ugi says the government gave goodwill, introductions and access to partners, while Nugi brought the engineering and commercial structure. He notes that the distinction between government money and government goodwill is a fine one, and it defines both the risk and the opportunity of his business model.

***

Nugi did not raise venture capital. Ugi says it was both a constraint and a choice. “We were based in Calabar, building technology for government and businesses. We were not a consumer startup chasing millions of users, so the funding ecosystem was not really designed for us,” he says, while also implying that the constraint became a discipline. “You cannot spend 18 months figuring out whether something works while burning someone else’s money.”

In 2024, he turned Nugi Tech into Nugi Group, adding education, agriculture, media, infrastructure and real estate. The thesis, he says, is overlooked talent and overlooked opportunities. He points to Terra Grid, a surveying and mapping business built around a brilliant, young surveyor he met in Calabar, at a time when the World Bank valued Nigeria’s land systems at more than USD 300 B. “People look at technology, agriculture, construction, media and real estate and see diversification,” he says. “I see the different parts of an ecosystem.”

The ecosystem is anchored by a plan for a technology city in Akpabuyo, 23 minutes from Calabar airport, with a Tier IV data centre at its core. Tier IV certification means 99.99% uptime, the kind of reliability banks and cloud providers need to host critical systems locally. Nugi says the facility will draw power from a nearby hydro turbine, an 80-megawatt solar farm, Cross River’s gas reserves and the national grid as backup. It is also exploring a subsea cable landing in Akpabuyo.

The gap between software contracts and capital-intensive infrastructure is vast. A data centre of that specification demands financing, engineering talent and power reliability at a scale Nugi has never operated. Ugi says the wider city is a nine-year project. “Lagos already had many people solving Lagos problems,” he says. “Cross River had gaps that needed people willing to build.”

At 40, he frames success in terms of legacy rather than achievement. “I want to create opportunities for other people,” he says. “I was once a young boy in Calabar trying to figure out what was possible. If what we build makes that path easier for the next person, that means more to me now than simply building another company.” The harder question is whether the path Nugi is building can outlast the political goodwill that helped clear it.

M-Pesa’s Dominance and Kenya’s digital payments landscape

By Ray Munene  |  November 10, 2026

Around the world Kenya is largely known as the home of innovations in digital payments.

This is mainly due to Safaricom’s flagship offering, M-Pesa. Since its launch in 2007, M-Pesa has allowed more Kenyans to swiftly send and receive money through the convenience of their mobile phones. In March 2026, exactly 19 years after M-Pesa’s launch, Safaricom announced that the mobile money platform had hit the milestone of 40 million customers.

In a research paper on mobile money payments, the World Bank described the service as follows: “M-PESA’s original core offering was the P2P payment – enabling customers to send money to anyone with access to a mobile phone. It opened up a market for transactions which previously were handled largely informally – through personal trips, friends, and public transport networks.”

Africa still remains the region with the highest fees for sending money.

Source: The World Bank / Bloomberg

Just as M-Pesa has transformed the financial landscape in Kenya, it is also an expensive product from a consumer point of view. This has led to increased competition from banks, neobanks and fintechs. The banking sector, through various Kenyan Banks has tried to curb M-Pesa’s market dominance through various offerings. I&M Bank removed all charges for bank-to-mobile-wallet transfers. Loop DFS has been hailed for maintaining free transfers before it was rebranded by NCBA and the charges were reintroduced.

In 2009, TEAMS (The East African Marine System), connecting Mombasa with Fujairah, greatly reduced the cost of internet access. This opened up access to the digital space, and this transition saw the financial needs of the population expand from simple P2P payments to digital commerce, BNPL solutions, stock market trading, overseas money transfers and offshore investments. Safaricom itself has also noted the growing needs and has developed new products. In a statement, Safaricom noted “investment and wealth management through Ziidi MMF, Ziidi Trader, credit services like Fuliza and KCB M-PESA.” . It continued to state, “business solutions such as Lipa na M-PESA, Pochi la Biashara and Global Pay.”

Indecisive government action:

In July 2022, the Asset Recovery Agency sought court orders prohibiting Flutterwave from doing business in Kenya. In March 2021, following a US$170 million Series C funding round, Flutterwave officially became a unicorn, surpassing the billion-dollar mark. Iyinoluwa Aboyeji, Adeleke Adekoya and Olugbenga Agboola founded the company in 2016. Flutterwave’s mission was to become a payment gateway that would revolutionise the speed of transactions within Africa. The Asset Recovery Agency claimed that Flutterwave had breached the country’s anti-money laundering laws. The firm’s funds in Kenya, amounting to $43 million, were frozen.

ARA dropped the charges after a couple of months, coinciding with a new government taking over just a few months earlier. Flutterwave CEO Olugbenga Agboola later made a public plea for a renewed licence, promising to expand the company’s footprint in Kenya.

In addition to this, the Central Bank of Kenya issued a directive pausing banks from doing business with Flutterwave and Chippercash. The CBK directed banks not to deal with the two entities due to a lack of proper licensing. The directive read in part: “It has come to the attention of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) that Flutterwave Payments Technology Ltd and Chipper Technologies Ltd have been engaging in the money remittance business without licensing and authorisation by CBK.”

Market entrants:

Newer players have recently pivoted to digital currencies and stablecoins, thereby avoiding regulations by central banks and oversight authorities. Kenya’s President assented to the Virtual Asset Service Provider Bill, and it officially became law on 4th November 2025. The law placed numerous requirements on companies planning to venture into the space. Under the requirements that took effect from November 2026, a stablecoin issuer needs a minimum capital of ksh 300 million. A virtual wallet provider needs a minimum capital of ksh 150 million. This sets a precedent as the first of its kind in East Africa.

Kenya’s bank-to-bank solution:

The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) through its subsidiary, Integrated Payment Services Limited owns PesaLink, an instant payment network . The instant payment service recently announced a partnership with the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS). The partnership aims to “ease cross-border payments and speed up regional financial integration.”

courtesy Afrexim Bank

PesaLink has been acknowledged at home as having lower rates than Safaricom’s M-Pesa. The bank-to-bank system also enjoys the support of Kenya’s banks, as the nation’s major banks are connected via PesaLink.

Kenya’s financial landscape is constantly evolving and M-Pesa’s relevance is slowly being eroded thanks to cheaper digital solutions in the market. What sets M-Pesa apart is it’s domination of mobile money payments, In contrast, the battle for instant account transfers is being led by PesaLink.

The AI Bank Promising To Fix Nigeria’s Money Problems Has A Lot To Prove

By Staff Reporter  |  November 9, 2026

Nigeria’s newest bank has a simple pitch. Rex Africa says it is the country’s first “AI-native” lender, built around artificial intelligence from the ground up rather than bolted on to an existing model. The company, which launched in late October 2026, offers savings, credit, payments and an AI financial agent called Rex Atlas that reads transaction history and offers conversational guidance on spending and saving.

On paper, it addresses a real gap. EFInA’s 2026 survey found that formal financial inclusion rose to 73% of Nigerian adults, yet only about 25% are financially healthy, meaning most banked Nigerians still lack real financial security. Rex is betting that intelligence, not just access, can close that gap.

But the launch materials leave basic questions unanswered. The company says it operates through Rex Microfinance Bank, yet its website shows no CBN licence number, as one publication pointed out. Its app store listing names RexCredit Limited as provider and Rex Financial Technologies Ltd as copyright holder, and records show it began life as Savyt in 2021 with a reported seed round of about USD 370 K. The same observation notes that the app has also been live since March 2024, which makes the October launch look more like an AI-led relaunch than a new bank.

Deposit protection is another gap. NDIC covers up to NGN 2 M (~USD 1.48 K) per depositor at microfinance banks, against NGN 5 M (~USD 3.7 K) at commercial banks, so a Rex saver with a large balance is only partly insured. Atlas also advises on borrowing while Rex sells loans through RexFlex, a tension the company has not addressed. And the site carries no privacy policy or terms, leaving unclear how Atlas uses customer data or whether it trains models on it.

Rex has not published customer numbers, deposits, loan books or default rates, and says only that it has attracted thousands of individuals and hundreds of businesses. It also offers investment guidance without saying what registration it holds for that, and no Nigerian rule yet sets a standard for AI that advises ordinary people on money. None of this means Rex cannot deliver. But for a firm asking customers to hand over their financial history, the burden of proof sits with the company.

Besides, Rex is entering one of Africa’s most crowded and well-capitalised retail banking markets. Fintech apps, not traditional banks, already dominate Nigerian smartphones. OPay is installed on 69% of devices surveyed by KPMG and Orange, PalmPay on 29%, Moniepoint on 14%, and Kuda on 8%. The best-performing legacy bank app, Access Bank, sits at 16%. These rivals are not standing still. Kuda has spent years building AI into advice and fraud tools, and Moniepoint processed NGN 412 T (USD 3-5.4 B) in payments in 2025.

The legacy banks are also mounting a costly counteroffensive. Nigeria’s ten largest lenders increased IT spending by 30.8% to NGN 177.91 B (USD 131.8 M) in the first quarter of 2026 alone, with Zenith Bank nearly doubling its technology budget to NGN 43.83 B (USD 32.4 M). That money is going into cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity and AI, precisely the ground Rex claims as its own.

Rex, by contrast, is a microfinance bank, not a commercial bank, operating under a different licence class with different limits. Competing with OPay’s balance sheet and Zenith’s IT budget will require far deeper pockets.

The regulatory backdrop adds another layer of execution risk. The Central Bank of Nigeria has upgraded fintech and microfinance licences to national status, raising minimum capital requirements to NGN 5 B (USD 3.7 M) for national operators. It has also set a January 2027 deadline for banks and fintechs to store payment transaction data on local servers, a costly compliance burden for smaller players. These are not minor operational details for a young microfinance bank trying to scale an AI platform.

Rex’s timing is sound because the financial health gap is real and policymakers are talking about it. But the gap between access and outcomes is exactly where fintechs and legacy banks are already fighting hardest.

Founder Yinka Odeleye says banking “should go beyond moving money to understanding customers”. That is a credible thesis. The harder question is whether a microfinance bank with limited capital can out-execute rivals that already own the customer relationship, the distribution and the technology budget. In Nigeria’s banking market, being first to a label is far easier than achieving durable scale, and it remains to be seen whether AI’s novelty alone would be enough.

OPay Seeks To Revive Terminated IPO Amid Crunch Talks To Appease China

By Staff Reporter  |  November 5, 2026

OPay, the Nigeria-focused fintech backed by SoftBank, pulled its USD 304 M New York listing hours after pricing it last week. The reason was an eleventh-hour inquiry from a Chinese regulator, despite the company having no operations or revenue in mainland China.

On the surface, the withdrawal looks like a decisive blow to one of Africa’s most anticipated tech listings. But according to Bloomberg, three people familiar with the matter say the discussions are not over. Talks between OPay and Chinese authorities are ongoing, though it remains unclear whether the regulatory concerns can be resolved. Insiders suggest the IPO is not dead, only halted and contingent on a negotiation that few outside the deal can see.

OPay is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and headquartered in Singapore. Nigeria accounted for 88.1% of its revenue in 2025. Its only link to China is founder Zhou Yahui, who also founded Kunlun Tech and was part of a consortium that acquired a stake in Opera in 2016.

Before the listing, OPay’s legal advisers concluded it did not need approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission because it had no mainland revenue and its operating assets sat outside China. The prospectus nonetheless warned that uncertainty remained over how Beijing’s overseas listing rules could be interpreted. That uncertainty has now materialised. Chinese regulators are asserting jurisdiction over a company that, by the letter of its own filings, should fall outside their remit.

The stakes extend beyond OPay’s USD 4 B valuation. Standard Bank Group, Africa’s largest lender by assets, signed a subscription agreement to invest up to USD 200 M in OPay. Completion is explicitly tied to the IPO closing. If the offering does not complete, the subscription agreement does not proceed to closing. The halted listing therefore freezes a strategic partnership that OPay had framed as a gateway to expanding across the continent. A revival of the IPO would unlock both the public capital and the balance-sheet backing of a major African bank.

OPay’s revenue reached USD 467 M in the first half of 2026, up from USD 197 M a year earlier. Its 50 million monthly active users and dominant position in Nigeria’s digital payments market are not in question. Yet a single regulatory inquiry from a jurisdiction where the company does not operate was enough to stop the clock.

“The withdrawal should not be interpreted as a reflection of its business performance, financial condition, operational integrity or regulatory standing,” OPay said in a statement.

The ongoing talks give OPay a path back. If the matter is resolved, the listing could be repriced and relaunched, and Standard Bank’s investment could still close. If it is not, the message for other Africa-focused founders with Chinese links will be that the reach of Beijing’s regulatory perimeter is longer than their operating footprint. The outcome of the OPay IPO saga could shape how African tech assesses its exposure to forces far beyond its borders.

African Tech’s Offshore ‘Paper Parents’ Face Tough Tax Reckoning

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 3, 2026

For a decade, the defining ritual of African venture capital has been the “flip.” A startup builds its product, hires its engineers, and finds its customers in Lagos, Nairobi, or Cairo, then incorporates a holding company in Delaware before the first institutional cheque arrives. The structure is often a compliance requirement imposed by investors who want a legal system they understand.

New data from a TLP Advisory report on 100 African tech companies shows just how lopsided this arrangement has become. The United States is the most common destination, with 67% of companies holding a US affiliation. But 81% of those US ties are incorporation and nothing else. There are no American customers, no American employees, and no American licences. The parent exists on paper.

The United Kingdom, by contrast, tells a different story. Of the 32% of companies with a UK affiliation, 47% have an operational presence and 19% hold regulatory licences. The UAE, meanwhile, is almost purely operational. Among its 23% of connected companies, 87% have people on the ground.

For years, this division of labour worked because tax authorities in home markets largely tolerated it. A Delaware parent could sell its shares and book a gain offshore, insulated from Nigerian or Kenyan capital gains tax. That tolerance is disappearing. Nigeria’s Tax Act 2025, which took effect in January, introduced an economic nexus rule. If more than half the value of an offshore holding company is derived from Nigerian assets, the sale of that company is taxable in Nigeria.

Foreign venture capitalists have warned the change could slow investment. “For founders, this means your exit valuation needs to be 20% higher just to give your investors the same net return they expected in 2024,” Segun Cole of Maasai VC told TechCabal in February.

L-R: Odun Longe, Funkola Odeleye, TLP Partners Co-Founders

The shift exposes a vulnerability at the heart of the incorporation-only model. A Delaware parent with no operational substance beyond a registered agent is precisely the kind of structure the new rules are designed to reach. The UK, which already hosts more real activity per affiliated company, is less exposed to that line of attack. A London entity with a licence, a team, and a bank account is harder to dismiss as a tax artifice.

TLP Advisory, a cross-border venture law practice with its origins in Nigeria, is careful not to overstate the UK’s advantage. “A round closed in Delaware and a license in London are both important but they play very distinct roles,” said Odunoluwa Longe, co-founder of TLP Advisory. The advice from Anthony William Catt of the UK Africa Sandbox is blunter: validate before you incorporate. “In the majority of cases our recommendation is a validation step with no entity,” he said.

That logic is about to become less optional. As African governments tighten the screws on indirect transfers and profit shifting, the purely paper parent will lose its appeal. The winners will be jurisdictions that allow a company to be both legally domiciled and economically present. TLP’s findings offer some evidence that the UK, with its combination of common law, tax incentives, and regulatory infrastructure, appears better placed for that future than the US.

Feature Image Credit: Dragos Condrea

Africa’s Hottest IPO Sold Out Online, Giving Tech A Tough Act To Follow

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 2, 2026

When Dangote Petroleum Refinery opened its USD 1.6 B initial public offering in September, the rush did not begin at bank branches or stockbroker offices. It began on mobile phones.

Within thirty minutes of the offer going live, traffic on Bamboo, one of Nigeria’s largest digital investment platforms, surged to ten times normal levels. The app crashed. So did Cowrywise and InvestNaija. “To be very, very honest, our system broke,” Bamboo co-founder Yanmo Omorogbe told Reuters at the time.

Six weeks later, the scale of what happened on those apps is becoming clear. Exclusive collation data first revealed by Nairametrics shows the offer drew about 1.55 million unique online retail subscribers who placed roughly 2.2 million transactions worth more than NGN 860 B (USD 560 M). Bamboo alone processed more than 600,000 transactions valued at about NGN 99 B, outpacing even legacy names like Zenith Bank, FirstBank, Chapel Hill Denham and the Nigerian Exchange’s own portal. Total retail participation, including offline and association-based purchases, could approach five million subscribers.

That is a striking number in a market where only about 600,000 of roughly six million registered Central Securities Clearing System accounts were active as of late 2025. In a single offer, Nigeria’s fintech apps appear to have onboarded more first-time retail investors than the traditional capital market had activated in years. Bamboo said more than 43% of its new users who subscribed to the IPO were first-time investors.

For Nigeria’s technology ecosystem, the temptation is to read this as a breakthrough. For a decade, venture capital has flowed into Nigerian fintech, commerce and logistics with few credible ways out. Mergers and acquisitions remain the dominant exit route, with 63 deals recorded across Africa in the first half of 2026. Nigeria has never produced a venture-capital-backed IPO. The NGX launched a dedicated Technology Board in 2022, but three years later it has yet to record a single listing. OPay, one of the country’s most valuable fintechs, just terminated a New York Stock Exchange listing amid regulatory hiccups.

The Dangote offer proves that digital distribution can mobilise retail capital at a scale the NGX has never seen, though whether tech companies can tap it is a different matter. The refinery is a mature, cash-generating industrial asset backed by Africa’s richest man and a distribution budget of at least USD 31 M, according to its prospectus. A growth-stage startup cannot replicate that machinery.

More fundamentally, many Nigerian startups are incorporated in Delaware or London, earn naira revenue but raise dollar capital, and their investors expect dollar returns. A 2025 TLP Advisory report found that 53% of founders had not considered an NGX listing because they did not understand how local listings work. A separate TLP analysis estimated that a private tech company valued at USD 100 M could be valued at only USD 60 M on the NGX.

While the Dangote IPO has widened the retail on-ramp, the exit door remains narrow. But the listing has arguably created a template for startups, regulators, and the exchange to study. The NGX has said it is courting technology companies and pushing for dual listings. But until the currency, valuation and structural gaps close, the millions of Nigerians who bought refinery shares through their phones will remain investors in refineries and banks, not in the fintech products they use every day.

Feature Image Credit: Reuters