Investors Seek Legal Recourse After Founder Trouble Kills Kloud Commerce

By Henry Nzekwe  |  October 20, 2022

A year on from landing a USD 765 K pre-seed to build a multi-channel commerce solution for African businesses starting in Nigeria, Kloud Commerce has closed its doors following a protracted period of disputes that left the startup crippled for months.

A series of internal squabbles between the startup’s founder Dr Olumide “D.O” Olusanya and the executive team contributed to the demise, WeeTracker learned from interviews with 10 persons associated with the company, coupled with an impasse between the founder and investors who are now understood to be seeking the intervention of Nigeria’s anti-graft body against D.O over allegations of misleading investors and fraudulently obtaining money under false pretence.

In a petition drafted by the investors seen to be addressed to Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, it is alleged that D.O misappropriated company funds, referencing an account audit that suggests the founder had diverted various sums of money invested into Kloud Commerce for personal ventures, put personal expenses on the company’s accounts, and burned investor money on expensive hotels and car rentals on dodgy trips outside Nigeria.

“He was and still is a massive disappointment,” said one of the investors who asked not to be identified at this time. “A former accountant left as a result of coming under pressure to do things that were unethical. I believe he mismanaged the funds that we invested and misled us as investors. It is very rare for a founder to spend almost USD 1 M without being able to produce even a minimum viable product.”

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D.O, a third-time founder with a storied career spanning over two decades who is among the pioneers of Nigeria’s digital payment system and also made early in-roads into retail e-commerce with the now-defunct Gloo.ng, launched what would be the latest venture Kloud Commerce (formerly PayPecker) last year.

A robust founding team that included co-founders David Umoh and Frank Atashili, as well as a few others wooed by D.O from notable companies such as Visa, d.Local, Andela, Flutterwave, and Socketworks, were good omens. Combined with the prospect of tapping a potentially lucrative opportunity in building offline-online commerce orchestration infrastructure and business process automation software for brands, retailers, restaurants, their suppliers and their customers, it was an attractive proposition for investors despite initial fears that the founder was not the easiest to work with, as one investor pointed out.

“D.O has great domain expertise and seemed to be on to something but I was never going to touch him with a ten-foot pole because he had a reputation for being super difficult,” said one investor who leads a prominent Lagos-based investment firm.

“But it looked like a strong play and many marquee investors – including prominent names in angel investing in Nigeria – were sold on its potential, as well as the profile and prowess of the team. “We thought we could overlook his character,” the same investor added.

Publicly available information shows that Kloud Commerce had raised USD 100 K from LoftyInc Capital Management and Ventures Platform by May 2021, and the startup would go on to receive a total of USD 765 K from 18 institutional and individual investors (including follow-on funding from some investors), as seen in documents obtained by WT. Vivazi, Flying Doctors, Niche Capital, KO Capital, and Afropreneur Angel Syndicate, among others, are notable investors. Idris Ayodeji Bello, Founding Partner at LoftyInc Capital, however, clarified that he wrote a personal angel cheque of USD 25 K through the Afroproneur Angel Syndicate and LoftyInc did not invest.

Some of the funders, including the one who spoke of some initial reservations, say they were encouraged to up their investments in Kloud Commerce by the periodic investor updates they received from D.O which painted a picture of impressive growth but turned out to be largely false.

In one such emailed update that went out in December 2021, D.O is observed to have told investors that one of the startup’s products, then known as PayPecker Omni, had gone live in 500 inventory locations across Nigeria and 300 locations across Ghana. “We presently have over 2,600 inventory locations signed up,” he had also written.

However, two persons who were executives at the company flatly called those claims lies while revealing that the startup was unable to deliver a basic product because of a series of questionable moves enforced by the founder.

“The progress he shared was deceptive, probably all lies, giving us make-believes just to unlock more money from investors,” said one of the lead investors.

D.O did not respond to multiple requests for comments on specific questions around his alleged mismanagement of company funds and the circumstances that saw Kloud Commerce shutter under a cloud. He did however suggest to WT in a couple of WhatsApp messages that the allegations are “wild and misleading.”

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Nevertheless, former executives and employees at Kloud Commerce paint a picture of a founder in a hurry who was painting a rosy picture to investors while continuously shattering the motivation of the team he had assembled. Insiders say D.O’s abrasive manner, aggressive cussing and swearing, and constant yelling and condescension was a jarring daily routine, combined with a tendency to be erratic, duplicitous, and cantankerous.

It was common for D.O to go into a tirade and disrespect co-founders openly, and he made a point to emphasise hierarchical superiority by reiterating from time to time that he is the “Founder” while the others are “Co-Founders”, according to one source. Another source, a software engineer who had joined the startup while D.O was out of town, said he was willing to quit the company after meeting D.O for the first time and experiencing shock.

In an interview with WT, three former executives at the now-shuttered Kloud Commerce shared that the veteran founder seemed to be in a rush.

D.O was often setting unrealistic goals, according to them, including a target of launching in 24 African countries and hitting 150 M in gross merchandise value by the end of 2022, as well as championing a target he called “BINTU” or “B in 2” – coined from “billion in 2 years” – which was hammered into company-speak and communicated in investor updates. This reflected the goal of pushing Kloud Commerce to a billion-dollar valuation in two years, which investors say they found to be disturbing and bizarre.

“We the investors expressed concerns and warned that this was a red flag as it demonstrated a lack of focus on the real business,” said Adedayo Amzat, Group Managing Director of Zedcrest Capital Group, which had invested in the startup.

The inexplicable, chaotic rush led to a series of questionable, misaligned decisions enforced by D.O despite the protests of co-founders and executives, one source told WT. “He would have his constant outbursts, basically bully everyone from employees to co-founders and just never listen to any second opinion. It was his way or the highway,” the former employee said.

An office space quoted at NGN 100 M (~USD 230 K) that was sanctioned by D.O was an early flashpoint, as was the decision to greenlight a hiring spree that grew the team to more than 30 employees (including a sales team that did little more than occasional prospecting) even though the startup hadn’t figured a direction. 

With a further half a dozen executives drawing substantial salaries, payroll was quite bloated from the start, and insiders say D.O routinely batted away concerns of out-of-control spending. In an update shared in September 2021, the founder declared Kloud Commerce’s burn rate to be USD 50 K a month.

“You can’t run a pre-seed startup like you are running a Flutterwave,” a former manager at Kloud Commerce shared on the condition of anonymity.

“He had built a business before having an actual product. When someone talks about cutting spending or the state of runway, D.O would basically turn it into a fight, barking that he is the CEO and money is his business and no one else’s. He would tell us to focus on building the product which itself was difficult because he kept getting in the way.”

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Two former executives said the founder often disrupted the build by destabilising the team with continuously altered briefs and sudden requests for additional complex features that deviated from plans and timelines agreed upon prior.

“D.O is brilliant and energetic, and I joined because I believed in the idea, but it didn’t help that he was very erratic and unreasonable, and he didn’t care for actionable details – just high-sounding language and power quotes,” shared one former executive who says he rues quitting his comfortable job and taking a significant pay cut to join the startup, after D.O relentlessly sold what seemed like a compelling proposition that was later found to be laden with half-truths.

“He would make demand after demand with impossible timelines and pursue it with aggression saying it came from investors, that startups are messy and we must find a way. But we would find out much later after things fell apart that investors had nothing to do with it. He was able to have his way at all times because he had made sure he had absolute control of finances and investor relations,” the source added.

What was already a difficult situation deteriorated further in the middle of last year when, according to two software engineers, D.O forced most of the company’s engineers to a new project without involving the CTO, Umoh, who had held firm that they stick to laid-out plans of finishing work on the flagship business-facing product, GoDigital, that had interested a big, cornerstone retail client to the extent that pre-contract agreements had been worked out. This would ultimately fall through as D.O forced the deprioritisation of the product in favour of a new project, according to former executives.

Engineers who spoke to WT say that working on the new project – a B2B2C product known as Omni which was being developed to enable retailers to deliver an omnichannel/omni-commerce experience to their own customers – put the technical team which, until then had been largely shielded from the rancour upstairs, directly under pressure from D.O.

This sparked a wave of resignations, one developer claims the team shrunk to just four engineers from 14 over a 3-month period. An executive said the attrition rate for Kloud Commerce’s engineering team was consistently over 60 percent.

Sources say the situation worsened when in August 2021, the CEO declared that Kloud Commerce would be showcasing the new product – which was quite complex and yet to see a single line of code – at the Food & Beverage West Africa event, which was less than three weeks away at the time. This was part of what D.O christened “Events-based DistroStrategy”, as seen in investor updates and a deck that went out last December seeking to raise USD 4 M seed for Kloud Commerce at a USD 20 M valuation, albeit with the product apparently still pending.

“It all makes sense now that he was optimising for a huge valuation and a quick cashout but we didn’t see it at the time,” one executive said. “The rush, the events, the premature expansion – it was to signal to investors and inflate valuation in the midst of the VC boom, so as to make a killing.”

According to one manager who would quit a few months later, all the protests of co-founders and executives to sit out the event fell on deaf ears as D.O overruled everyone. And engineers would bear the brunt of the frantic rush, overworked as they held on to assurances of bonuses and rewards that later went unfulfilled.

“Ten engineers were camped in a hotel working round the clock for a week, living on take-out and energy drinks,” one engineer told WT. “One guy fainted at one point, and I fell sick afterwards with test results showing my blood pressure was high.”

“Those guys did in less than 3 weeks what would take most organisations six months to a year to pull off and it took its toll, affecting their health and personal lives,” one manager said. “When they complained, D.O dismissed them saying they are not kids, that they can’t expect him to teach them how to manage their time.”

Two executives who worked at Kloud Commerce noted that the startup got mostly nothing from the event after paying thousands of dollars to participate, and two other costly events would follow on D.O’s command: Beauty West Africa in Lagos last November and Accra Fashion Week in December which cost the startup a significant sum as headline sponsor.

“That Ghana dabble was particularly bizarre because we hadn’t even gotten on our feet in Nigeria and despite our protests, he went there and set up a team that was drawing USD 5 K in salaries every month without doing anything of note,” one executive claimed. “He stayed in Ghana for nearly three months living out of a hotel that cost USD 100.00 a night, which he put on the company’s tab.”

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Money problems would eventually surface at Kloud Commerce as salaries became delayed. Investors say they were taken aback when D.O wrote them just before Christmas declaring the startup had less than a month of runway and seeking a USD 100 K bridge round, having given no prior indication of the impending crunch.

“It’s crazy that he knew the company was short on funds, yet he kept promising huge bonuses that were never going to be fulfilled and demanding new hires, some of whom never got paid as he had swiftly demanded their termination on the grounds of economic downturn,” one source remarked.

Having been kept in the dark, the dire picture would become clear to investors between April and May this year when a board was constituted to address the issues.

“It was a shitshow. We found that the relationship between the co-founders had completely deteriorated due to D.O’s attitude, staff morale was on the floor, salaries and benefits were owed, money had been wasted, and the company had more than one hundred million naira in liabilities,” one of the investors told WT.

In their petition, investors referenced supporting documents showing D.O had drawn several millions of naira in salary payments to himself in advance, even while employees at Kloud Commerce had gone unpaid or had their salaries delayed. Two executives claim D.O had led them to believe he had gone unpaid for months, causing them to forfeit some salaries to sort of match his sacrifice.

Audits of Kloud Commerce accounts, according to the petition, also show D.O drawing NGN 4 M (~USD 9 K) as entertainment allowance between August and September 2021, the investors claim, as well as NGN 22 M (~USD 50 K) expended in questionable publicity events and the trip to Ghana.

They also allege that D.O had between June and August 2021 diverted NGN 25 M (~USD 57 K) meant for Kloud Commerce to Paymente Ltd., a company he controls, while another USD 15 K from an angel investor ended up in his pockets and never reached the company’s accounts.

Former executives further claim that taxes and pension deducted from employee salaries never got remitted, and that D.O routinely put personal expenses on the company’s accounts. As earlier mentioned, D.O did not respond to WT’s request for comments on these allegations.

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Nevertheless, to salvage the situation, investors were willing to put in a further USD 250 K on the condition of restructuring the company such that D.O would leave the CEO role and the co-founders would take over.

One investor said a recapitalisation exercise was also done to reallocate shares with D.O said to have agreed to the new terms, only to drag his feet and pull out at the last moment before reinstating himself as CEO and eventually making himself chairman of the board after frustrating other board members to the point of resignation.

“An investor had committed USD 50 K with which we kept the lights on and more was on the way, but D.O essentially killed the deal by being uncooperative,” said one executive. “There was a way to make sure all the effort and sweat of people who had given a lot didn’t go to waste, but the ego of one founder was apparently more important.”

Zedcrest’s Amzat told WT that they got a term sheet for USD 200 K from Zrosk, after the USD 50 K that was provided to keep the company afloat, but “the founder thoroughly sabotaged the deal.”

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In an email dated September 2 seen by WT, D.O addressed Kloud Commerce employees (who by then had gone several months without pay) explaining that a “demon investor” had attempted to stage a hostile takeover using abusive methods and threatening legal action on “cooked-up allegations of financial impropriety.” He also added that he was stressed to the point of suffering a health emergency.

But disgruntled employees lashed out, describing his explanation as deceptive and manipulative in their responses, and the embattled founder later tried to enforce mass termination of employees who did not attend a physical meeting he called at the company’s offices in Lekki in the middle of last month.

“People invested in him and in the company in good faith, and if he had delivered even close to what he had promised, there wouldn’t be any issues today,” one of the lead investors volunteered while asking to not be identified.

“When investors lost confidence in him, there was an agreement, which he signed, that he would step down as CEO, but still keep his vested shares. After signing he reneged on that agreement. There was no hostile takeover.”

Kloud Commerce, which had been in limbo since May due to the intractable disagreements and unending back-and-forths, eventually ground to a halt. At a virtual all-hands meeting that took place around noon on Friday, September 30, D.O addressed the few employees who showed up, for what would be the last time, informing them that the company would permanently cease operations effective immediately.

D.O had also requested that all company assets (IDs, laptops, etc.) in their possession be returned by October 15 as he aimed to settle outstanding salaries and benefits from the proceeds of liquidation. However, employees who spoke to WT maintain a defiant stance, holding on to the properties as leverage as they are not convinced he can be trusted.

“There’s nothing to suggest he will do right by the people,” said a former engineer at Kloud Commerce who has now landed a remote job at a foreign tech company.

“It does feel like a needlessly very expensive class on how not to run a business. I think it’s easier to accept it when a startup fails because of a flawed idea or a poor team. What makes this especially painful for me is that we had those things going for us and went at it with genuine belief, only to be deliberately sabotaged by the person in charge,” he added.

UPDATE: An update was made to this article at 12:54 WAT on 20/10/2020 to clarify that LoftyInc Capital did not invest in Kloud Commerce.

South Africa’s AI Paradox Has Near-Universal Use And Near-Zero Proof

By Staff Reporter  |  November 18, 2026

Nine in ten large South African organisations now use generative AI in some form. That is up from 45% two years ago, tracking an adoption curve that looks like a stampede. But the same research house that tracked that surge has attached a number to what comes next, and the number is concerning. The value pillar of the new SA AI Index scores South Africa at 16.6 out of 100. The average organisation scrapes together a total index score of 34.3.

The study, conducted by World Wide Worx with Altron Digital Business, surveyed 100 decision-makers at firms employing more than 200 people. It found that 73% of organisations have no tools to assess whether AI delivers value. Another 71% cannot put a figure on the cost savings AI supposedly generates. Only 27% can measure value at all.

Arthur Goldstuck, World Wide Worx’s chief executive, put the gap in plain terms. “Using AI and getting value from it are very different things,” he said. “Today almost everyone uses AI, often in a shallow way, and many organisations are discovering that a language model on every desk does not automatically translate into business results”.

The collapse in confidence is steep. Positive ratings for AI’s impact on productivity fell from 96% in 2024 to 51% this year. Positive assessments of competitiveness dropped from 86% to 37%, and customer service from 66% to 38%. TechCentral noted that earlier World Wide Worx figures combined “positive” and “very positive” responses, and it is not yet clear whether the 2026 numbers use the same basis. The direction of travel, however, is not in dispute.

The firms getting results look different from the rest. Among the 30% with AI live in core business processes, 80% report a positive productivity impact. Among those still experimenting, that figure falls to 44%. Among ad hoc users, it is 6%. Only 6% of organisations with AI in production report a positive effect on profit.

There is a governance problem layered on top. 75% of organisations report unofficial “shadow AI” use, up from 52% in 2025. A third cannot point to any formal AI control. Craig Stewart, managing director of Altron Digital Business, said the gap is between “having AI and having it at the heart of the business”.

The measurement vacuum is not unique to South Africa. A separate ITWeb survey this year found 36% of local organisations do not measure AI return on investment at all, and only 13% do so consistently. The difference is the scale of the adoption wave now crashing into that blind spot.

Trapped Customer Funds At Raven Expose The Ugly Side Of Nigeria’s Fintech Boom

By Staff Reporter  |  November 16, 2026

A single customer complaint has cracked open a wider problem in Nigeria’s digital banking sector. More than NGN 17 M (USD 12.6 K) belonging to a Raven user known on X as Legacy remains stuck after he tried to liquidate a fixed deposit. The platform first returned a message saying “Transfer failed, please try again later,” then cited maintenance for months, and eventually showed a zero spendable balance while still displaying the funds.

Legacy says he put his money into Raven after a public endorsement by Chinonso Egemba, the health influencer widely known as Aproko Doctor, who served as the company’s brand ambassador. That detail has turned a liquidity failure into a public argument about who carries responsibility when a fintech app stops working as advertised.

Raven’s chief executive, Uchenna Nnodim, has told customers that the disruption followed the withdrawal of a banking partner’s operating licence. A portion of customer funds sat with that partner, which cut Raven’s liquidity and its ability to process withdrawals. The partner was Beststar Microfinance Bank, identified in Raven’s own app listing, and its licence was among 46 revoked by the Central Bank of Nigeria effective July 1, 2026.

The company says it is pursuing two recovery paths. It is engaging regulators to recover funds held with the former partner and raising fresh capital to settle customer obligations. It has also split balances on its app so that old funds remain visible but restricted while new deposits sit under a separate “Usable Balance”. Nnodim has said more than 650,000 customers have regained access, but Raven has not disclosed how much money remains trapped, set a repayment date, or provided an aggregate figure for restricted funds.

Aproko Doctor says his ambassadorship ended in 2024 and that he is not an owner, shareholder, employee or representative of Raven. In a statement pinned on X, he said his recommendations reflected his own experience at the time. “When I recommend a product, I am giving my honest view of it at the time I recommend it,” he wrote. “That recommendation cannot guarantee how a company will behave years later. And it does not make me responsible for a business I do not run.” He urged affected customers to file written complaints with Raven and escalate unresolved cases to the CBN’s Consumer Protection Department.

Activist Martins Vincent Otse, known as Verydarkman, rejected that position and pointed to a 2025 post in which Aproko Doctor appeared to promote Raven, contradicting the claim that the deal ended in 2024. “Meaning you are lying,” Verydarkman said in an Instagram video. Legacy has since told Verydarkman that Raven released his money in instalments after the complaint gained traction, but other customers remain locked out.

Separately, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has charged a man over an alleged NGN 700 M (~USD 520 K) fraud involving the bypass of two-factor authentication on Ravenpay user accounts between March 2025 and January 2026. The case has no direct link to the liquidity crisis, but it adds to questions about operational controls at a platform that marketed itself as a safe home for savings.

Raven, on its part, has committed to publishing a formal progress update every two weeks on its recovery process and the steps being taken to settle outstanding customer balances. “We will also keep engaging affected customers directly and giving them honest, accurate information about their own cases,” it said in a statement issued today.

As it stands, the CBN’s consumer protection department is the only body with the power to compel a resolution, and for thousands of Raven customers, that inbox is now the last available recourse.

Africa’s AI Startups Face A Cost Trap As Expenses Dwarf Earnings

By Staff Reporter  |  November 13, 2026

African artificial intelligence businesses have attracted USD 1.3 B in disclosed funding over the past decade, but a new industry survey suggests the capital is colliding with a hard economic truth. Building and selling AI in Africa remains a structurally expensive proposition, and the gap between global input costs and local purchasing power is threatening the sector’s next stage of growth.

The report, “AI Made in Africa: Voices from AI businesses across Africa“, published by German development agency GIZ and data firm Briter, mapped 311 AI ventures across the continent. The headline funding figure masks a far leaner reality. The median funding ticket is just USD 225 K, roughly a third of the companies remain entirely bootstrapped, and only 15% are profitable. More than 75% of all capital raised has gone to businesses founded before 2020, leaving newer AI-native startups to operate in a funding environment shaped by an older generation of raises.

The core problem is a price mismatch that runs through every layer of the business. For 65% of surveyed companies, cloud computing, GPUs and AI infrastructure are their largest development expense, and those bills are denominated in US dollars at rates comparable to markets in Europe or the United States. Yet more than half of these businesses price their products below USD 2.5 K a year per customer, roughly USD 208.00 a month. That is a sum that, for many small African enterprises, competes directly with internet access, generator fuel or staff salaries.

The infrastructure deficit behind those costs also poses a headache. Africa holds less than 1% of global data-centre capacity while hosting about 18% of the world’s population, meaning most AI computation for African companies runs on foreign servers.

Moreover, currency shocks amplify the squeeze. The 2023 naira devaluation reportedly drove local cloud bills up by 224% for some Nigerian users, and founders now describe devaluation as a permanent operating risk rather than an exceptional event. A company serving thousands of daily users can spend USD 20 K to USD 50 K a month on third-party AI APIs alone, costs that scale with success rather than flattening out.

Selling into this environment carries its own costs. The survey found that 65% of businesses identify customer trust and AI literacy as their top scaling barrier, ahead of development costs. Many global models perform poorly on African data because they were trained on foreign datasets, forcing companies to spend time and resources demonstrating reliability to sceptical buyers. Government sales, which 44% of the companies pursue, can take 12 to 18 months to close, stretching cash flow for startups that need regular revenue to survive.

The talent market adds another expense. Africa accounts for roughly 1% of the global AI talent pool, and 51% of surveyed founders say senior AI research roles are the hardest to fill. Nearly half have responded by building internal training pipelines, effectively becoming educators as well as technology companies.

The businesses are not asking for sympathy, the report notes, but for patient capital that understands the operating environment, and for public interventions that lower input costs rather than simply celebrating the sector’s growth. Whether that capital and those policies arrive will determine if Africa’s AI economy can move from a promising experiment to a sustainable industry.

Image Credits: AfDB

Newcomers Are Tinkering With New Models To Replace Uber In Nigeria

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 12, 2026

The scramble to replace Uber in Nigeria is being fought over who absorbs the cost of a trip, and the new entrants are making bets that Uber itself could not sustain.

Uber ended operations in Nigeria on September 2 after twelve years, leaving behind a market worth about USD 450 M in 2025 and projected by Ken Research to reach USD 982 M by 2032. Bolt and inDrive moved quickly to absorb riders and drivers, but a cluster of newer and local players is now testing structurally different models. Loop, FastDrive, SimpliRide and Shuttlers are shaping up as not merely cheaper versions of Uber but experiments in who pays when the fare does not cover the journey.

The most aggressive of these is Loop, which launched in Port Harcourt and Delta State in October and says drivers keep 100% of their fares, paying the platform through a subscription rather than a per-trip commission. FastDrive, founded by Okechukwu Mathew and launched publicly on October 15, takes a related route. Drivers set their own per-kilometre price within limits, pay no percentage commission, and owe a flat NGN 1 K (about 74 cents) daily fee after their first two rides.

On a strong day, the appeal is straightforward. A driver on a 25% commission who grosses NGN 40 K (~USD 30.00) hands over NGN 10 K (USD 7.43). On FastDrive, the same driver pays less than a dollar, provided the rides arrive. But the risk has not disappeared. Under a commission model, the platform earns less when the driver earns less. Under a subscription or a daily fee, the driver owes the platform whether the day is good or bad. A fuel queue, a police checkpoint, a breakdown, a slow Monday, and the fixed cost is still due. The model that looks most driver-friendly on a busy day can be the least forgiving on a quiet one.

inDrive’s recent move is the clearest admission that pure negotiation has a ceiling. The company built its Nigerian business on letting riders name a fare and drivers accept, reject or counter, charging a service fee of about 10%. It insists the bidding model is intact.

“Our model is the same. We didn’t change overnight. We just introduced the One Click option, which lets you skip bidding if you are in a hurry,” the company says. But One Click removes the negotiation and lets inDrive set the price. Fares on One Click run roughly 40% to 50% higher than the recommended fares on the basic ride category, an observation of the app reflects, though the option may be a way to help drivers earn more without leaving them to riders who bid below acceptable levels.

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Shuttlers is not competing inside that same on-demand frame. The company has run scheduled shared buses in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt since 2016, completing more than 10 million journeys and operating over 430 buses daily. In September, shortly after Uber’s exit, it launched Shuttlers Pod, a door-to-door car service that carries three to four commuters who book in advance and share the vehicle, with a fixed fare and no surge pricing or roadside negotiation.

Pod trips cost roughly 50% less than typical ride-hailing fares, enabled by advance booking and shared occupancy. “Nigeria’s cost of living is rising faster than incomes,” chief executive Damilola Olokesusi said at the launch. “With that reality, the smartest way to move people is through shared mobility”.

The challenge these entrants are trying to surmount is the one that broke Uber. A report by Obi, a California-based price and trip data aggregator, found that Uber paid drivers more than it charged passengers on trips shorter than roughly 20 kilometres, with the gap reaching 23% on journeys between 5km and 9km. Nigerian Uber drivers averaged 130 rides over the first seven months of 2026, against 1,142 for Uber drivers in South Africa, an 8.8-fold gap in per-driver volume. “Low per-driver volume plus a per-ride subsidy is a bad combination: there’s no scale to absorb the loss,” the report said.

Fuel has not helped. Petrol has risen from about NGN 830.00 a litre to roughly NGN 1.4 K, a near-70% increase in the single largest operating cost, while platform commissions on the established apps have stayed between 20% and 35%. Bolt’s Nigeria driver guide lists a 20% commission, and the Amalgamated Union of App-Based Transporters of Nigeria has demanded a 10% cap and a fare review, staging a strike in October that shut down the Bolt and inDrive apps in Lagos.

Bolt, which held the largest share of Nigeria’s market by the time Uber left, recorded a 92% week-on-week increase in Nigerian driver registrations after the exit. inDrive saw app installs surge 96%, according to local reports. But Ayoade Ibrahim, co-founder of the drivers’ union, warned that reduced competition over time could lead to less favourable terms for both riders and drivers, and that the platforms that last will be the ones that can hold a fare high enough for drivers and low enough for riders while still funding support, insurance and compliance.

That is the unresolved question at the centre of Nigeria’s ride-hailing reset. Subscriptions make drivers pay upfront while daily fees make them pay regardless. Meanwhile, One Click quietly concedes that negotiation alone underprices the work and shared scheduled rides avoid the problem by selling a different product. None of these models has yet demonstrated that it can carry the full weight of on-demand mobility at scale in a market where fuel, inflation and currency have already broken one global operator.

The Unlikely Rise Of A Sickle Cell Survivor Behind A Data Centre & Tech City In Nigeria’s Overlooked Region

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 11, 2026

The meeting nearly ended with Ugi Augustine Ugi thrown out of the room. It was 2016, and he had come to tell the Calabar Carnival Commission that its biggest annual event was leaving money on the table. Why, he asked, did a festival that drew 100,000 people a day still depend on government funding every year? Why not merchandising, a streaming economy, commercial sponsors?

“They were not ready for that conversation,” Ugi tells WT. Nearly a decade later, his company runs the carnival’s digital registration, voting and stakeholder systems.

That persistence runs through Nugi Group, the company Ugi founded in 2016 in Calabar, a port city in Cross River State in southern Nigeria. It also explains a business that has grown by taking on problems others avoided, often in places others ignored.

Ugi was born with sickle cell anaemia. The illness shaped his first ambition. He wanted to become a doctor because he wanted to help people like himself. “Medicine made sense to me as a child because of what I was living with,” he says.

The pivot came in secondary school at the West African Peoples Institute in Calabar, where he was a laboratory prefect. In 2004, a telecoms engineer arrived to install computers. Ugi kept asking questions about the internet and how the systems worked. Those conversations opened a door that medicine could not close. He later realised he had not abandoned the original impulse. “I still wanted to solve problems and improve people’s lives,” he says. “Technology simply became the tool I chose to do it.”

By 2006 he was learning web development on a partial scholarship and working in a cybercafé. His parents, both civil servants, were not impressed. Technology, in their view, was a path to becoming a secretary, he said in a previous interview in which he also revealed that he entered a televised game show on his father’s phone, won NGN 20 K (around USD 155.00 at the time) , and used his share to pay for a programming course. He never collected the certificate after a dispute over e-books, but he kept the knowledge.

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Nugi nearly did not survive its early years. The company grew to 23 employees, then shrank to five as clients paid late and deals collapsed. “The most dangerous thing an early-stage company can do is grow its headcount before it’s grown its revenue discipline,” Ugi tells WT.

The near-death experience hardened the company. Every hire, product and partnership, he emphasised, had to justify itself. There were other low points, including a major health setback that forced him to pause almost everything. He wrote about that period in a memoir, Blood of the Phoenix.

What Nugi built instead was a business anchored in government contracts, an unusual path for a Nigerian tech company seeking scale. It took on revenue administration, land management and citizen services for Cross River State.

The founder says its systems helped the state grow internally generated revenue, the taxes and fees the state collects itself rather than federal handouts, by 60.6% to NGN 36.3 B between June 2023 and May 2024. By December 2024 the figure had reached NGN 46 B. More than 7,500 land files have been digitised, and certificate-of-occupancy processing has been cut to 21 days for government land.

The numbers are looking up, though the causal chain is harder to verify. Revenue can rise because software closes leakages. It can also rise because enforcement tightens, tax rates change, or inflation pushes nominal receipts up. Nugi’s biggest client is also its biggest concentration risk given that state budgets tend to move with oil receipts and political priorities. A change of governor can change a vendor’s fortunes overnight.

Ugi is aware of the scepticism. He points to Cally Air, the state-owned airline, as an example of what he means by government needing expertise rather than cash. “Five aircraft, no naira of government funding, yet flying on goodwill to build a sustainable, independent business model,” he says.

Cally Air is owned by the Cross River State government, and the state procured its fleet. Ugi says the government gave goodwill, introductions and access to partners, while Nugi brought the engineering and commercial structure. He notes that the distinction between government money and government goodwill is a fine one, and it defines both the risk and the opportunity of his business model.

***

Nugi did not raise venture capital. Ugi says it was both a constraint and a choice. “We were based in Calabar, building technology for government and businesses. We were not a consumer startup chasing millions of users, so the funding ecosystem was not really designed for us,” he says, while also implying that the constraint became a discipline. “You cannot spend 18 months figuring out whether something works while burning someone else’s money.”

In 2024, he turned Nugi Tech into Nugi Group, adding education, agriculture, media, infrastructure and real estate. The thesis, he says, is overlooked talent and overlooked opportunities. He points to Terra Grid, a surveying and mapping business built around a brilliant, young surveyor he met in Calabar, at a time when the World Bank valued Nigeria’s land systems at more than USD 300 B. “People look at technology, agriculture, construction, media and real estate and see diversification,” he says. “I see the different parts of an ecosystem.”

The ecosystem is anchored by a plan for a technology city in Akpabuyo, 23 minutes from Calabar airport, with a Tier IV data centre at its core. Tier IV certification means 99.99% uptime, the kind of reliability banks and cloud providers need to host critical systems locally. Nugi says the facility will draw power from a nearby hydro turbine, an 80-megawatt solar farm, Cross River’s gas reserves and the national grid as backup. It is also exploring a subsea cable landing in Akpabuyo.

The gap between software contracts and capital-intensive infrastructure is vast. A data centre of that specification demands financing, engineering talent and power reliability at a scale Nugi has never operated. Ugi says the wider city is a nine-year project. “Lagos already had many people solving Lagos problems,” he says. “Cross River had gaps that needed people willing to build.”

At 40, he frames success in terms of legacy rather than achievement. “I want to create opportunities for other people,” he says. “I was once a young boy in Calabar trying to figure out what was possible. If what we build makes that path easier for the next person, that means more to me now than simply building another company.” The harder question is whether the path Nugi is building can outlast the political goodwill that helped clear it.

M-Pesa’s Dominance and Kenya’s digital payments landscape

By Ray Munene  |  November 10, 2026

Around the world Kenya is largely known as the home of innovations in digital payments.

This is mainly due to Safaricom’s flagship offering, M-Pesa. Since its launch in 2007, M-Pesa has allowed more Kenyans to swiftly send and receive money through the convenience of their mobile phones. In March 2026, exactly 19 years after M-Pesa’s launch, Safaricom announced that the mobile money platform had hit the milestone of 40 million customers.

In a research paper on mobile money payments, the World Bank described the service as follows: “M-PESA’s original core offering was the P2P payment – enabling customers to send money to anyone with access to a mobile phone. It opened up a market for transactions which previously were handled largely informally – through personal trips, friends, and public transport networks.”

Africa still remains the region with the highest fees for sending money.

Source: The World Bank / Bloomberg

Just as M-Pesa has transformed the financial landscape in Kenya, it is also an expensive product from a consumer point of view. This has led to increased competition from banks, neobanks and fintechs. The banking sector, through various Kenyan Banks has tried to curb M-Pesa’s market dominance through various offerings. I&M Bank removed all charges for bank-to-mobile-wallet transfers. Loop DFS has been hailed for maintaining free transfers before it was rebranded by NCBA and the charges were reintroduced.

In 2009, TEAMS (The East African Marine System), connecting Mombasa with Fujairah, greatly reduced the cost of internet access. This opened up access to the digital space, and this transition saw the financial needs of the population expand from simple P2P payments to digital commerce, BNPL solutions, stock market trading, overseas money transfers and offshore investments. Safaricom itself has also noted the growing needs and has developed new products. In a statement, Safaricom noted “investment and wealth management through Ziidi MMF, Ziidi Trader, credit services like Fuliza and KCB M-PESA.” . It continued to state, “business solutions such as Lipa na M-PESA, Pochi la Biashara and Global Pay.”

Indecisive government action:

In July 2022, the Asset Recovery Agency sought court orders prohibiting Flutterwave from doing business in Kenya. In March 2021, following a US$170 million Series C funding round, Flutterwave officially became a unicorn, surpassing the billion-dollar mark. Iyinoluwa Aboyeji, Adeleke Adekoya and Olugbenga Agboola founded the company in 2016. Flutterwave’s mission was to become a payment gateway that would revolutionise the speed of transactions within Africa. The Asset Recovery Agency claimed that Flutterwave had breached the country’s anti-money laundering laws. The firm’s funds in Kenya, amounting to $43 million, were frozen.

ARA dropped the charges after a couple of months, coinciding with a new government taking over just a few months earlier. Flutterwave CEO Olugbenga Agboola later made a public plea for a renewed licence, promising to expand the company’s footprint in Kenya.

In addition to this, the Central Bank of Kenya issued a directive pausing banks from doing business with Flutterwave and Chippercash. The CBK directed banks not to deal with the two entities due to a lack of proper licensing. The directive read in part: “It has come to the attention of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) that Flutterwave Payments Technology Ltd and Chipper Technologies Ltd have been engaging in the money remittance business without licensing and authorisation by CBK.”

Market entrants:

Newer players have recently pivoted to digital currencies and stablecoins, thereby avoiding regulations by central banks and oversight authorities. Kenya’s President assented to the Virtual Asset Service Provider Bill, and it officially became law on 4th November 2025. The law placed numerous requirements on companies planning to venture into the space. Under the requirements that took effect from November 2026, a stablecoin issuer needs a minimum capital of ksh 300 million. A virtual wallet provider needs a minimum capital of ksh 150 million. This sets a precedent as the first of its kind in East Africa.

Kenya’s bank-to-bank solution:

The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) through its subsidiary, Integrated Payment Services Limited owns PesaLink, an instant payment network . The instant payment service recently announced a partnership with the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS). The partnership aims to “ease cross-border payments and speed up regional financial integration.”

courtesy Afrexim Bank

PesaLink has been acknowledged at home as having lower rates than Safaricom’s M-Pesa. The bank-to-bank system also enjoys the support of Kenya’s banks, as the nation’s major banks are connected via PesaLink.

Kenya’s financial landscape is constantly evolving and M-Pesa’s relevance is slowly being eroded thanks to cheaper digital solutions in the market. What sets M-Pesa apart is it’s domination of mobile money payments, In contrast, the battle for instant account transfers is being led by PesaLink.

The AI Bank Promising To Fix Nigeria’s Money Problems Has A Lot To Prove

By Staff Reporter  |  November 9, 2026

Nigeria’s newest bank has a simple pitch. Rex Africa says it is the country’s first “AI-native” lender, built around artificial intelligence from the ground up rather than bolted on to an existing model. The company, which launched in late October 2026, offers savings, credit, payments and an AI financial agent called Rex Atlas that reads transaction history and offers conversational guidance on spending and saving.

On paper, it addresses a real gap. EFInA’s 2026 survey found that formal financial inclusion rose to 73% of Nigerian adults, yet only about 25% are financially healthy, meaning most banked Nigerians still lack real financial security. Rex is betting that intelligence, not just access, can close that gap.

But the launch materials leave basic questions unanswered. The company says it operates through Rex Microfinance Bank, yet its website shows no CBN licence number, as one publication pointed out. Its app store listing names RexCredit Limited as provider and Rex Financial Technologies Ltd as copyright holder, and records show it began life as Savyt in 2021 with a reported seed round of about USD 370 K. The same observation notes that the app has also been live since March 2024, which makes the October launch look more like an AI-led relaunch than a new bank.

Deposit protection is another gap. NDIC covers up to NGN 2 M (~USD 1.48 K) per depositor at microfinance banks, against NGN 5 M (~USD 3.7 K) at commercial banks, so a Rex saver with a large balance is only partly insured. Atlas also advises on borrowing while Rex sells loans through RexFlex, a tension the company has not addressed. And the site carries no privacy policy or terms, leaving unclear how Atlas uses customer data or whether it trains models on it.

Rex has not published customer numbers, deposits, loan books or default rates, and says only that it has attracted thousands of individuals and hundreds of businesses. It also offers investment guidance without saying what registration it holds for that, and no Nigerian rule yet sets a standard for AI that advises ordinary people on money. None of this means Rex cannot deliver. But for a firm asking customers to hand over their financial history, the burden of proof sits with the company.

Besides, Rex is entering one of Africa’s most crowded and well-capitalised retail banking markets. Fintech apps, not traditional banks, already dominate Nigerian smartphones. OPay is installed on 69% of devices surveyed by KPMG and Orange, PalmPay on 29%, Moniepoint on 14%, and Kuda on 8%. The best-performing legacy bank app, Access Bank, sits at 16%. These rivals are not standing still. Kuda has spent years building AI into advice and fraud tools, and Moniepoint processed NGN 412 T (USD 3-5.4 B) in payments in 2025.

The legacy banks are also mounting a costly counteroffensive. Nigeria’s ten largest lenders increased IT spending by 30.8% to NGN 177.91 B (USD 131.8 M) in the first quarter of 2026 alone, with Zenith Bank nearly doubling its technology budget to NGN 43.83 B (USD 32.4 M). That money is going into cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity and AI, precisely the ground Rex claims as its own.

Rex, by contrast, is a microfinance bank, not a commercial bank, operating under a different licence class with different limits. Competing with OPay’s balance sheet and Zenith’s IT budget will require far deeper pockets.

The regulatory backdrop adds another layer of execution risk. The Central Bank of Nigeria has upgraded fintech and microfinance licences to national status, raising minimum capital requirements to NGN 5 B (USD 3.7 M) for national operators. It has also set a January 2027 deadline for banks and fintechs to store payment transaction data on local servers, a costly compliance burden for smaller players. These are not minor operational details for a young microfinance bank trying to scale an AI platform.

Rex’s timing is sound because the financial health gap is real and policymakers are talking about it. But the gap between access and outcomes is exactly where fintechs and legacy banks are already fighting hardest.

Founder Yinka Odeleye says banking “should go beyond moving money to understanding customers”. That is a credible thesis. The harder question is whether a microfinance bank with limited capital can out-execute rivals that already own the customer relationship, the distribution and the technology budget. In Nigeria’s banking market, being first to a label is far easier than achieving durable scale, and it remains to be seen whether AI’s novelty alone would be enough.

OPay Seeks To Revive Terminated IPO Amid Crunch Talks To Appease China

By Staff Reporter  |  November 5, 2026

OPay, the Nigeria-focused fintech backed by SoftBank, pulled its USD 304 M New York listing hours after pricing it last week. The reason was an eleventh-hour inquiry from a Chinese regulator, despite the company having no operations or revenue in mainland China.

On the surface, the withdrawal looks like a decisive blow to one of Africa’s most anticipated tech listings. But according to Bloomberg, three people familiar with the matter say the discussions are not over. Talks between OPay and Chinese authorities are ongoing, though it remains unclear whether the regulatory concerns can be resolved. Insiders suggest the IPO is not dead, only halted and contingent on a negotiation that few outside the deal can see.

OPay is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and headquartered in Singapore. Nigeria accounted for 88.1% of its revenue in 2025. Its only link to China is founder Zhou Yahui, who also founded Kunlun Tech and was part of a consortium that acquired a stake in Opera in 2016.

Before the listing, OPay’s legal advisers concluded it did not need approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission because it had no mainland revenue and its operating assets sat outside China. The prospectus nonetheless warned that uncertainty remained over how Beijing’s overseas listing rules could be interpreted. That uncertainty has now materialised. Chinese regulators are asserting jurisdiction over a company that, by the letter of its own filings, should fall outside their remit.

The stakes extend beyond OPay’s USD 4 B valuation. Standard Bank Group, Africa’s largest lender by assets, signed a subscription agreement to invest up to USD 200 M in OPay. Completion is explicitly tied to the IPO closing. If the offering does not complete, the subscription agreement does not proceed to closing. The halted listing therefore freezes a strategic partnership that OPay had framed as a gateway to expanding across the continent. A revival of the IPO would unlock both the public capital and the balance-sheet backing of a major African bank.

OPay’s revenue reached USD 467 M in the first half of 2026, up from USD 197 M a year earlier. Its 50 million monthly active users and dominant position in Nigeria’s digital payments market are not in question. Yet a single regulatory inquiry from a jurisdiction where the company does not operate was enough to stop the clock.

“The withdrawal should not be interpreted as a reflection of its business performance, financial condition, operational integrity or regulatory standing,” OPay said in a statement.

The ongoing talks give OPay a path back. If the matter is resolved, the listing could be repriced and relaunched, and Standard Bank’s investment could still close. If it is not, the message for other Africa-focused founders with Chinese links will be that the reach of Beijing’s regulatory perimeter is longer than their operating footprint. The outcome of the OPay IPO saga could shape how African tech assesses its exposure to forces far beyond its borders.

African Tech’s Offshore ‘Paper Parents’ Face Tough Tax Reckoning

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 3, 2026

For a decade, the defining ritual of African venture capital has been the “flip.” A startup builds its product, hires its engineers, and finds its customers in Lagos, Nairobi, or Cairo, then incorporates a holding company in Delaware before the first institutional cheque arrives. The structure is often a compliance requirement imposed by investors who want a legal system they understand.

New data from a TLP Advisory report on 100 African tech companies shows just how lopsided this arrangement has become. The United States is the most common destination, with 67% of companies holding a US affiliation. But 81% of those US ties are incorporation and nothing else. There are no American customers, no American employees, and no American licences. The parent exists on paper.

The United Kingdom, by contrast, tells a different story. Of the 32% of companies with a UK affiliation, 47% have an operational presence and 19% hold regulatory licences. The UAE, meanwhile, is almost purely operational. Among its 23% of connected companies, 87% have people on the ground.

For years, this division of labour worked because tax authorities in home markets largely tolerated it. A Delaware parent could sell its shares and book a gain offshore, insulated from Nigerian or Kenyan capital gains tax. That tolerance is disappearing. Nigeria’s Tax Act 2025, which took effect in January, introduced an economic nexus rule. If more than half the value of an offshore holding company is derived from Nigerian assets, the sale of that company is taxable in Nigeria.

Foreign venture capitalists have warned the change could slow investment. “For founders, this means your exit valuation needs to be 20% higher just to give your investors the same net return they expected in 2024,” Segun Cole of Maasai VC told TechCabal in February.

L-R: Odun Longe, Funkola Odeleye, TLP Partners Co-Founders

The shift exposes a vulnerability at the heart of the incorporation-only model. A Delaware parent with no operational substance beyond a registered agent is precisely the kind of structure the new rules are designed to reach. The UK, which already hosts more real activity per affiliated company, is less exposed to that line of attack. A London entity with a licence, a team, and a bank account is harder to dismiss as a tax artifice.

TLP Advisory, a cross-border venture law practice with its origins in Nigeria, is careful not to overstate the UK’s advantage. “A round closed in Delaware and a license in London are both important but they play very distinct roles,” said Odunoluwa Longe, co-founder of TLP Advisory. The advice from Anthony William Catt of the UK Africa Sandbox is blunter: validate before you incorporate. “In the majority of cases our recommendation is a validation step with no entity,” he said.

That logic is about to become less optional. As African governments tighten the screws on indirect transfers and profit shifting, the purely paper parent will lose its appeal. The winners will be jurisdictions that allow a company to be both legally domiciled and economically present. TLP’s findings offer some evidence that the UK, with its combination of common law, tax incentives, and regulatory infrastructure, appears better placed for that future than the US.

Feature Image Credit: Dragos Condrea

Africa’s Hottest IPO Sold Out Online, Giving Tech A Tough Act To Follow

By Henry Nzekwe  |  November 2, 2026

When Dangote Petroleum Refinery opened its USD 1.6 B initial public offering in September, the rush did not begin at bank branches or stockbroker offices. It began on mobile phones.

Within thirty minutes of the offer going live, traffic on Bamboo, one of Nigeria’s largest digital investment platforms, surged to ten times normal levels. The app crashed. So did Cowrywise and InvestNaija. “To be very, very honest, our system broke,” Bamboo co-founder Yanmo Omorogbe told Reuters at the time.

Six weeks later, the scale of what happened on those apps is becoming clear. Exclusive collation data first revealed by Nairametrics shows the offer drew about 1.55 million unique online retail subscribers who placed roughly 2.2 million transactions worth more than NGN 860 B (USD 560 M). Bamboo alone processed more than 600,000 transactions valued at about NGN 99 B, outpacing even legacy names like Zenith Bank, FirstBank, Chapel Hill Denham and the Nigerian Exchange’s own portal. Total retail participation, including offline and association-based purchases, could approach five million subscribers.

That is a striking number in a market where only about 600,000 of roughly six million registered Central Securities Clearing System accounts were active as of late 2025. In a single offer, Nigeria’s fintech apps appear to have onboarded more first-time retail investors than the traditional capital market had activated in years. Bamboo said more than 43% of its new users who subscribed to the IPO were first-time investors.

For Nigeria’s technology ecosystem, the temptation is to read this as a breakthrough. For a decade, venture capital has flowed into Nigerian fintech, commerce and logistics with few credible ways out. Mergers and acquisitions remain the dominant exit route, with 63 deals recorded across Africa in the first half of 2026. Nigeria has never produced a venture-capital-backed IPO. The NGX launched a dedicated Technology Board in 2022, but three years later it has yet to record a single listing. OPay, one of the country’s most valuable fintechs, just terminated a New York Stock Exchange listing amid regulatory hiccups.

The Dangote offer proves that digital distribution can mobilise retail capital at a scale the NGX has never seen, though whether tech companies can tap it is a different matter. The refinery is a mature, cash-generating industrial asset backed by Africa’s richest man and a distribution budget of at least USD 31 M, according to its prospectus. A growth-stage startup cannot replicate that machinery.

More fundamentally, many Nigerian startups are incorporated in Delaware or London, earn naira revenue but raise dollar capital, and their investors expect dollar returns. A 2025 TLP Advisory report found that 53% of founders had not considered an NGX listing because they did not understand how local listings work. A separate TLP analysis estimated that a private tech company valued at USD 100 M could be valued at only USD 60 M on the NGX.

While the Dangote IPO has widened the retail on-ramp, the exit door remains narrow. But the listing has arguably created a template for startups, regulators, and the exchange to study. The NGX has said it is courting technology companies and pushing for dual listings. But until the currency, valuation and structural gaps close, the millions of Nigerians who bought refinery shares through their phones will remain investors in refineries and banks, not in the fintech products they use every day.

Feature Image Credit: Reuters